86-443

No.

Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

JAMES B. STANLEY,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Does Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), bar suit for constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985 by an Army enlisted man against state civilian employees who at all times acted under federal military direction and control?

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties to the proceedings below include the United States of America, Joseph R. Bertino, M.D., Sidney Gottlieb, M.D., Bernard G. Elfert, Van Sim, M.D., H. D. Collier and Albert Dreisbach, as federal defendants;* the University of Maryland Board of Regents, Gerald Klee, M.D., Walter Weintraub, M.D., as Maryland defendants. Respondent is plaintiff James B. Stanley.

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*On September 9, 1986, the United States filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case captioned United States of America, et al. v. Stanley, No. 86-393. The instant petition and that of the United States in No. 86-393 should be considered together because both arise from the same decision of the Eleventh Circuit.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF MARYLAND, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

JAMES B. STANLEY, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners, University of Maryland Board of Regents, Walter Weintraub and Gerald Klee, pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit entered in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida have decided issues raised in this action. The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-38a) is reported at 786 F.2d 1490. The order denying the petition for rehearing (App., infra, 39a-40a) is unreported. The district court's orders granting the motion to dismiss the United States and denying the motion to dismiss the individual federal defendants (App., infra, 41a-64a) are reported at 549 F.Supp. 327 and 552 F.Supp. 619. The district court's orders reconsidering its denial of the motion to dismiss the individual federal defendants (App., infra, 65a-122a) are reported at 574 F.Supp. 474 and 587 F.Supp. 1071. The prior

opinion of the court of appeals vacating an earlier district court order granting summary judgment for the United States (App., infra, 123a-176a) is reported at 639 F.2d 1146.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was entered on April 21, 1986. A petition for rehearing was denied on June 17, 1986. This petition was filed within 90 days of the judgment entered June 17, 1986. This Court has jursidiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983, provides in pertinent part:

> Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State of Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. §1985 provides in pertinent part:

> If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws... in any case of consipracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff in this case was an Army enlisted man who in 1958 participated in secret United States Army chemical warfare tests at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories on the Aberdeen Proving Grounds' Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland. The plaintiff, who volunteered to participate in the program while on active duty, was administered, without his knowledge, lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD") as part of the Army's chemical warfare testing program. In 1978, plaintiff, then a civilian, brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") alleging that the government had been negligent in administering the LSD and negligent in failing to monitor plaintiff's condition after discharge.

In 1979, the district court dismissed these FTCA claims, holding that they were barred by Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.

135 (1950). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, finding, without expressing an opinion on the merits, that "[plaintiff] Stanley has at least a colorable constitutional claim based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)." Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1159 (5th Cir. 1981). (App., infra, 174a).

On remand, plaintiff amended his complaint to add new Bivens claims against his superior military officers and the federal civilians who had participated in the program. In an order entered October 15, 1982, the district court declined to dismiss the Bivens claims against the individual defendants. Stanley v. United States, 549 F.Supp. 327 (S.D. Fla. 1982). (App., infra, 41a).

On February 3, 1983, the plaintiff filed his second amended complaint asserting Bivens claims against the individual federal petitioners in United States v. Stanley, No. 86-393, as well as §§1983 and 1985 claims against several state defendants.[1] The state defendants are the University of Maryland Board of Regents, Walter Weintraub, M.D., and Gerald Klee, M.D.

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[1] Plaintiff alleged that "[t]he wrongful act of the Defendants consists of an intentional act while Plaintiff was on active duty and subsequent negligent failure to protect Plaintiff, after becoming a civilian, from the dire consequences flowing from the original wrong." (Second Amended Complaint ¶11). Plaintiff further alleged that the harm resulted from "[t]he actions and omissions of the Defendants, federal executive department officials and agents, who were acting under color of a covert federal Army problem [sic] * * *. (Id. at ¶14). The complaint asserts that the alleged conduct of the federal defendants violated plaintiff's "constitutional right to privacy . . . implicit in the First, Third, Fourth and Ninth Amendments . . . and . . . implicit in the concept of liberty within the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and generally within the 'penumbras' of the Bills [sic] of Rights." (Id. at 17).

In 1958, Drs. Weintraub and Klee were young physicians in the psychiatric residency program at the University of Maryland Hospital. As part of their residency training, they were assigned to the Army's research program at Edgewood Arsenal under a research contract between the Army and the University of Maryland.

The State physicians had nothing to do with the initiation, development, or drafting of the research contract. Their duties were ministerial in character and were limited to screening the volunteer test subjects and recording the results of the experiments. At all times, the Maryland petitioners were under the complete control and direction of the U.S. Army. They exercised no individual

authority and were civilian agents of the Army.[2]

The claims against the state defendants were not addressed directly in the district court's decision or in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion; however, the logic and rationale of the Eleventh Circuit's decision that plaintiff may pursue his Bivens claims against his federal military superiors sustains plaintiff's right to pursue his §§1983 and 1985 claims against the state defendants because

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[2] To state a claim under §1983, plaintiff must allege that defendants acted under color of state law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 526 (1981). In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged only that the state defendants acted under color of law, in recognition of the fact that the law under which the state defendants acted was federal, and not state, law. On this basis, the state defendants moved the district court in April, 1983 to dismiss plaintiff's case for failure to state a claim under the civil rights statutes. The court has never ruled upon that motion.

the two sets of constitutional claims are identical in both fact and legal theory.[3]

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Summary

This case presents the important question of whether the immunity which this Court has granted to federal military personnel is available to state employees who at all times were under the direct supervision and control of the military. The Eleventh Circuit's decision constitutes a dangerous misreading of this Court's holding in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), and will expose state civilians to potential liability for actions taken in the course of assisting the

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[3] This Court has recognized that "42 U.S.C. §1983 serves similar purposes" as a Bivens claim. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 n.6 (1980). See also, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 238 n.16 (1979) (§1983 provides a cause of action for violations of the Constitution, but inapplicable to federal officials).

military in scientific research and other endeavors.

While the Eleventh Circuit did not address plaintiff's claims against the state defendants, the question of their immunity is integrally related to the immunity of the federal defendants.[4] The Eleventh Circuit held that federal military personnel were not entitled to immunity here, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff complains about actions which he admits occurred when he was an Army enlisted man and when the principal defendants were his superior military officers. Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d at 1490. (App., infra, 1a).

Were this court not to extend immunity to the state defendants, who were civilian

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[4] The second question presented in the petition for certiorari of the federal defendants in this case asserts that they are immune from plaintiff's constitutional claims against them. See, United States v. Stanley, No. 86-393, at i.

employees agents of the military, the rationale for military immunity would be severely undermined. A trial of plaintiff's claims against the state defendants would necessarily require exactly the same extensive inquiry into military planning and orders that this Court has foreclosed by its decisions in Feres v. United States, Chappell v. Wallace, and United States v. Shearer, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 3039 (1985).

This Case Presents The Important And Unresolved Question of Whether State Civilian Employees Who Work For And Are Subject To Federal Military Supervision Are Entitled To Immunity.

1. The rationale of federal military immunity of Chappell v. Wallace should be extended to subordinate state civilian employees working for the military.

The targets of plaintiff's case are the United States Army and its officials. The 1958 chemical warfare experimentation program in which plaintiff participated and about

which he complains was planned, conducted, and controlled by the U.S. Army. Plaintiff concedes in his second amended complaint that the experiment was a "federal Army program which was implemented by the United States Government" and that "the purpose was purportedly for the development and testing of methods of defense against chemical warfare attacks."[5]

Plaintiff's allegations are directed against the federal government and its officers for it is they who allegedly "invaded his fundamental right of privacy" through a government program where federal officials and agents were acting under color of a "covert federal Army program". Plain-

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[5] When plaintiff originally filed suit in 1978, he sued only federal agencies. Following the Fifth Circuit's 1981 decision, plaintiff amended his complaint adding unknown federal agents and officers. He did not include the three Maryland defendants as parties until February, 1983, five years after he originally filed this action.

tiff's Second Amended Complaint, ¶14.[6]

Chappell bars constitutional claims by military personnel against their superior officers based on the Feres rationale, which barred common law tort claims by military personnel against their superior officers. Civilian employees of the federal government also enjoy immunity from civil liability for common law torts. See Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Watkins v. United States, 462 F.Supp 980, aff'd 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1979). See also, Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1238 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).

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[6] Indeed, the Fifth Circuit in an earlier decision in this case stated that the experiment was conducted on an Army base for the benefit of the Army pursuant to to explicit federal statutory and regulatory authority. 639 F.2d at 1148 n.2, (App., infra, 126a). Further, Plaintiff participated in the Army program while on active military duty and was "subject to ultimate military control throughout the duration of his participation in the program." Id. at 1152 (App., infra, 141a).

These decisions extended immunity to federal civilians because the defendants' civilian status is not a basis for ignoring the sound rationale of the Feres doctrine.[7]

In this case, pre-trial discovery and the trial itself would necessitate extensive inquiry into, and second guessing of, military orders, priorities, command structure, and discipline. This inquiry would include the testimony of members of the armed forces regarding their decisions and actions in conducting the Army's chemical warfare experiments in 1958. A federal courtroom is not the proper forum for plaintiff's proposed broad ranging inquiry into these military policies.

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[7] Only the Eleventh Circuit disagrees. See Johnson v. United States, 779 F.2d 1492, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed sub nom. United States v. Johnson, No. 85-2039.

2. Plaintiff's civil rights claims against the state defendants fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because plaintiff is challenging defendants' performance of duties carried out under military planning and orders.

In Chappell, this Court relied heavily on the Feres doctrine that bars not only monetary liability but also any inquiry or investigation into military decision making to conclude that "enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations". 462 U.S. at 305.[8]

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[8] Although the only defendants in Chappell were military officials, the reasoning of that decision has been applied equally to Bivens-type actions against civilian officials who act in conjunction with military planning and orders. Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, reh'g denied, 720 F.2d 677, (5th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 104 S.Ct. 2354 (1984). See, also, Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1238 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). Here, plaintiff's constitutional tort claims against the state civilian employees under §§1983 and 1985 are factually indistinguishable from his Bivens claims against the federal defendants. See n.1, supra, and accompanying text.

Plaintiff's §§1983 and 1985 claims against the State defendants are barred by the reasoning of Chappell. The pursuit of those claims involves precisely the detailed inquiry into military actions, decisions, policies, and motives that is and should be precluded. Furthermore, in this case where the state actors were admittedly minor figures in a federal military program, there is certainly no basis for denying the state defendants the same level of absolute civil immunity which this Court has granted military personnel.

Simply stated, the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes were not intended to be the vehicle for obtaining federal court review of a federal military program.[9]

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[9] Plaintiff's claim under §1985 is plainly without merit as plaintiff does not allege, because he cannot allege, any racial or class-based animus. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).

Notwithstanding the obviousness of this proposition, plaintiff is seeking to do just that. His attempt to use these statutes for a purpose which Congress never contemplated, let alone intended, should be rejected.

3. Failing to grant immunity to state university employees who work directly with and for the military will result inevitably in state universities withholding their assistance and expertise from the military.

The policy consequences of the Eleventh Circuit's decision are large, obvious, and detrimental: state universities simply will not participate in scientific experiments or other endeavors conducted by the military if their participation exposes them to civil liability, particularly if their military superiors avoid liability solely on the basis that they were in the military.[10]

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[10] Here, of course, the Eleventh Circuit did not hold that the federal military personnel were immune from plaintiff's Bivens action. The harshest result in this case and the one about which the state defendants must be concerned would be a holding by this Court (cont'd)

For decades, the United States military has relied upon the cooperation of civilian institutions of higher education for research, development, testing, and analysis. These activities have been considered essential to the nation's defense. The military's -- and ultimately the country's -- ability to call upon this crucial national intellectual resource will be jeopardized if state university civilians who assist the military are not afforded the same immunity from suit as this Court has wisely and repeatedly granted to federal military employees.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, and those stated in the petition of the United States in the

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reversing the Eleventh Circuit's decision with respect to the immunity of the federal defendants, thereby dismissing plaintiff's constitutional claims against them, but allowing plaintiff to proceed with his constitutional claims against the state defendants.

related case of United States v. Stanley, No. 86-393, this Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-5273

JAMES B. STANLEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
and JOSEPH R. BERTINO,
ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Apr. 21, 1986

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON*, Senior Circuit Judge, and ALLGOOD**, Senior District Judge.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

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* See Rule 3(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

** Honorable Clarence W. Allgood, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.

We are again faced with the task of defining the limits of the doctrine first announced in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), to determine whether a former serviceman may maintain this lawsuit against federal officials, both civilian and military, for injuries suffered before or after his discharge from military service. In affirming, we permit the lawsuit.

Appellants, several military personnel and civilians, appeal the district court's finding that the complaint in this case states a cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) and that the action is not barred by Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983).[1]

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[1] The individual defendants are Joseph R. Bertino, M.D.; H.D. Collier; Albert (cont'd)

FACTS

In February, 1958, appellee, James B. Stanley was a master sergeant in the United States Army. Stanley volunteered to participate in a program purportedly designed to develop and test military equipment and protective clothing for use during chemical warfare. On four occasions during the program, unknown to him, Army officials and others gave Stanley lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). After the 1958 LSD experiments, Stanley served in the Army for eleven

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Dreisbach; Bernard G. Elfert; Sidney Gottlieb, M.D.; and Van Sim, M.D., all of whom are or were federal employees or officers of the United States Army. Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency is also named as a defendant. The individual state defendants who were added are the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland; Gerald Klee, M.D.; and Walter Weintraub, M.D. Klee and Weintraub were physicians in the psychiatric residency program at the University of Maryland Hospital and participated in the 1958 experiments under a research contract between the United States Army and the University of Maryland.

years. The Army discharged him in 1969. The Army never informed Stanley that he had been administered LSD during the 1958 program. Stanley did not become aware of the LSD experiments until December, 1975, when the Department of the Army sent him a letter soliciting his participation in a follow-up study of persons who had been subjects of the 1958 experiments.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The original complaint in this case was filed on May 8, 1978, and consisted of claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§1346(b), 2671-2680 (West 1984), (FTCA), for negligent administration of the LSD experiments.[2] The

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[2] Stanley's original complaint named the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Department of Defense, and the United States Army as defendants. The complaint was amended to name the United States Government as the proper party defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act. "Unknown individual (cont'd)

district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment relying on the doctrine enunciated in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950). Under the Feres doctrine, "the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159.

On appeal, the former Fifth Circuit held that the district court's application of the Feres doctrine was correct insofar as it precluded Stanley's claim for injuries sustained while he was in military service, but that the district court had improperly granted the government's motion for summary judgment. According to the former Fifth Circuit, the proper disposition of the case

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federal agents and officers" were also named as defendants.

was dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (Stanley I). The case was remanded to the district court for consideration of any amendment that Stanley might offer to cure the jurisdictional defect by alleging damages for injuries which occurred after his discharge from the Army.[3]

On July 21, 1981, Stanley amended his complaint to allege both a post-discharge claim for negligence under the FTCA and a constitutional tort claim under Bivens. On

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[3] The former Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the government's argument that it would be futile to remand the action because any amendment which Stanley might make, including any constitutional claim, would be barred by Feres. The court declined to express any opinion on the merits of any new claims which Stanley might assert, but found that "Stanley has at least a colorable constitutional claim based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 69 (1971)." Stanley I, 639 F.2d at 1159 (citations omitted).

October 15, 1982, the district court dismissed Stanley's post-discharge FTCA and Bivens claims against the United States Government. The district court held, however, that Stanley had stated a Bivens action against the individual federal agents and officers who participated in the LSD experiments, for violation of his constitutional "rights of privacy and bodily integrity, and of the right of an individual to control his mind, his private thoughts and his intellectual process." Stanley v. United States, 549 F.Supp. 327, 331 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (Stanley II).

Upon motion by the government, on November 9, 1982, the district court entered final judgment in favor of the government and vacated and withdrew that portion of its October, 1982, order which addressed Stanley's Bivens claim against the individual defendants. The district court held that if

Stanley did not identify and serve at least one individual defendant within ninety days of its order, it would dismiss Stanley's Bivens claim against the "unknown" individual defendants.

On February 3, 1983, Stanley filed a second amended complaint naming the appellants as individual defendants. The district court apparently considered Stanley's second amended complaint sufficient to automatically reinstate that portion of its October, 1982, order which it had vacated.

In rejecting the argument that any Bivens claim which Stanley might have had against the individual defendants was precluded by Feres, the district court cited Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981). The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in Chappell and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,

103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Chappell, on October 28, 1983, the district court rendered an opinion clarifying its disposition of Stanley's Bivens claim against the appellants and explaining that Chappell did not affect that disposition. Stanley v. United States, 574 F.Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983), modified, 587 F.Supp. 1071 (S.D. Fla. 1984).

The district court analyzed Chappell and concluded that Chappell did not establish a per se rule prohibiting military personnel from maintaining suits against their superiors to recover damages for alleged constitutional violations. Since it found the facts of this case distinguishable from those in Chappell, the district court considered whether either of the two exceptions to a Bivens action would preclude this action. Finding that neither the "special

factors" exception, nor the adequate alternative remedy exception were applicable in this case, the district court concluded that Stanley stated a cause of action against the individual agents and officers of the United States who participated in the LSD experiments.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §1292(b) (West Supp. 1985), on January 31, 1984, the district court certified its October 28, 1983, order for interlocutory appeal. By order dated April 13, 1984, we granted the appellants' motion for interlocutory appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

The appellants contend that the district court erred in holding that Stanley's Bivens action is not barred by Chappell. They argue that Chappell enunciated an absolute, per se rule that military servicemen may not bring Bivens actions against their superiors because such suits would necessitate inquiry

into the internal structure of the military and thereby undermine discipline.

Stanley contends that Chappell does not state an absolute rule and that the "special factors" present in Chappell are not present in this case so as to negate his Bivens action.

The appellants also urge us to address Stanley's statutory civil rights claims on the merits, even though the district court failed to address those claims. The appellants argue that the resolution of those issues now will promote both judicial economy and fairness because the same rationale which precludes Stanley's Bivens claim also precludes his statutory claims.

Stanley contends that we should not consider his statutory claims because those claims have yet to be addressed by the district court. Stanley also points out that the statutory claims are beyond the scope of

this court's order allowing this interlocutory appeal.

ISSUES

We must decide whether Stanley's Bivens action is precluded by the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Chappell and whether to dispose of Stanley's statutory civil rights claims on the merits.

DISCUSSION

I. Bivens Claim

Appellants contend that Stanley's action is barred by the absolute rule enunciated in Chappell that military personnel cannot sue their superiors for constitutional torts.

A. The Feres Doctrine

The Supreme Court has articulated several different formulations of the considerations which it deems controlling in Feres doctrine analysis. In Feres itself the Supreme Court identified four factors from

which it concluded that Congress had not intended to subject the government to liability for the serviceman's injuries: (1) the lack of parallel private liability; (2) the fact that because state law governs an action under the FTCA, the serviceman's right to recover would depend upon the geographical location of the serviceman's duty station, a fortuitous circumstance over which the serviceman has no control; (3) the "distinctively federal character" of the relationship between the government and its military personnel; and (4) the absence of any provision under the FTCA for adjustment of a serviceman's recovery under the Act with any recovery which he might receive under military statutory compensation schemes. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-46, 71 S.Ct. at 156-59.

Underlying these considerations was the belief that the relationship between a soldier and his superior officer is so unique

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and the intramilitary system of justice and administrative regulatory and remedial procedures so extensive that civilian courts should "hesitate long" before intervening to remedy any wrong allegedly done a serviceman. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 591. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112, 75 S.Ct. 141, 143, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954):

> The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claim Act were alleged for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the Court [in Feres] to read the Act as excluding claims of that character. [Citation omitted.]

The Supreme Court has continued to recognize the distinctively federal character of the relationship between the government and members of its armed forces, and the existence of a statutory "no-fault"

compensation scheme as elements in the Feres analysis. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299, 103 S.Ct. at 2364, 76 L.Ed.2d at 590; Stencel Aero Engineering v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977). In United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1857, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963), however, the Court acknowledged that "[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best explained" by the Brown formulation of the doctrine. As demonstrated by the Court's emphasis in Chappell, the concern that civilian court inquiry might adversely affect the intramilitary disciplinary structure has emerged as the most compelling rationale for the Feres doctrine. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 590-91, 593; United States v. Johnson, 749 F.2d 1530, 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1985).

B. The Chappell Extension of Feres

The Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), that a federal official's violation of an individual's constitutional rights gives rise to a cause of action for damages, despite the absence of a federal statute specifically authorizing such constitutional tort actions. A Bivens cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, where the defendant demonstrates either that there are "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress," or that Congress has provided an "equally effective" alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the constitution. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2004, 2005.

In Chappell, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the "special factors" that bear upon the propriety of a Bivens action brought by military personnel against their superior officers. The Court concluded that those "special factors" also formed the basis of the Court's decision in Feres. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298, 103 S.Ct. at 2364, 76 L.Ed.2d at 589-90.

The servicemen in Chappell were members of the United States Navy. Their duty station was a combat naval vessel. The servicemen alleged that because of their minority race, their superior officers failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed upon them penalties of unusual severity. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297, 103 S.Ct. at 2364, 76 L.Ed.2d at 589. The Court concluded that the "special factors" of "the unique disciplinary structure of the military

establishment and Congress's activity in the field" dictated against providing the servicemen a Bivens remedy against their superior officer. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593.

The military establishment is founded upon a unique "hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command." Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 591. The servicemen in Chappell were on active duty and subject to direct orders. The Supreme Court concluded that if those servicemen were permitted to expose their superior officers to personal liability, "[t]he special nature of military life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel, would be undermined." Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593.

The Supreme Court's decision to bar the

servicemen's claim was also influenced by the fact that the statutory scheme and the comprehensive internal justice system which Congress had devised to regulate military life, adequately provided for the review and remedy of the servicemen's racial discrimination complaints. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302, 103 S.Ct. at 2366, 76 L.Ed.2d at 592.

The Court cautioned that it was not establishing a per se rule that military personnel could never seek redress in civilian courts for constitutional violations suffered in the course of military service:

> This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.

Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593 (citation omitted).

> Civilian courts must [merely] hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers [because] that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the military establishment.

Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 591.

C. Application of Chappell

The first "special factor" considered by Chappell, is the "unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment." Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. Unlike Chappell, this case does not present a situation where "[t]he special nature of military life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel, would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to

command." Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593.

Stanley was a volunteer participant in the chemical warfare program. He had been released from his regular duties to participate in this program, administered by both military and civilian personnel. Stanley was not subject to direct military orders, but was free to leave the program at any time.

Most importantly, however, Stanley ingested the LSD when he was instructed to drink a clear substance which, unbeknownst to him, contained the hazardous drug. Because he was surreptitiously administered the drug, Stanley could not possibly have challenged his "orders" to drink the clear substance. "The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders" are not implicated by the facts of this case. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 590. There is no concern here

that the "peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors" might be disrupted. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112, 75 S.Ct. at 143.

The other "special factor" which the Court in Chappell considered compelling is Congress's plenary authority over the military and its extensive activity in the field. 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. We conclude that this factor also does not militate against permitting Stanley's Bivens claim. Those intramilitary administrative procedures which the Court found adequate to redress the servicemen's racial discrimination complaints in Chappell are clearly inadequate to compensate Stanley for the violations complained of here. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 592-93. The Board for the Correction of Naval Records is not available to Stanley, nor can Stanley avail himself of

the remedies provided under article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §938 (West 1983). Article 138 is not available to veterans.

Neither of the "special factors" which the Supreme Court deemed dispositive in Chappell are present in this case. We hold, therefore, that Stanley's action is not precluded by Chappell. Our inquiry is not at an end, however. We must now consider whether Stanley's action is precluded under the adequate alternative remedy Bivens exception.[4]

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[4] Because the Supreme Court in Chappell found that there were "special factors" which precluded the servicemen's action, it did not reach the question of whether the intramilitary remedies which it relied upon as "special factors" were sufficiently adequate alternative remedies to preclude the action under the second Bivens exception. A defendant in a Bivens action need merely establish one of the exceptions to defeat the action. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471-1472, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980).

Appellants argue that the Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C.A. §§301-362 (West 1979) (VBA), is a sufficiently adequate alternative remedy to a Bivens action to preclude Stanley's claim. Bivens requires that the appellants show that Congress explicitly declared the Veterans Benefits Act to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and that Congress viewed the Act as equally effective as a Bivens action. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16-19, 100 S.Ct. at 1470-1472. As the Supreme Court explained in Carlson,

> our inquiry at this step in the analysis is whether Congress has indicated that it intends a statutory remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the Bivens remedy. Where Congress decides to enact a statutory remedy which it views as fully adequate only in combination with the Bivens remedy, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §2680(h) [28 U.S.C.S. §2680(h)], the congressional decision should be given effect by the courts.

Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19 n.5, 100 S.Ct. at

1472 n.5.

We do not find, nor has any other court which has addressed this issue found, any expression of congressional intent that the VBA constitute a serviceman's exclusive remedy for injuries incurred incident to military service.

Appellants rely upon Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672-73, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 2058, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977), to support their argument that the VBA is an adequate alternative remedy to a serviceman's Bivens action. The serviceman in Stencel sued the manufacturer of the egress life-support system in his fighter aircraft for the injuries he sustained when the system malfunctioned. The third-party claimant cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity. The Supreme Court considered the same factors which it considers under a claim brought directly by a

serviceman to preclude the third-party claimant's indemnity claim. 431 U.S. at 670-74, 97 S.Ct. at 2057-59.

The serviceman in Stencel was receiving benefits under the VBA. In rejecting the third-party claimant's argument that the availability of the VBA to the serviceman barred its indemnity action for damages which it might be required to pay the serviceman, the Supreme Court concluded that the VBA serves a dual purpose. It provides a remedy for injured servicemen and its clothes the government in the "protective mantle of the Act's limitation-of-liability provisons." See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 115, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2179, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974). Stencel concluded, without further analysis, that "the military compensation scheme provides an upper limit of liability for the Government as to service-connected injuries. To permit [the

third-party claimant's] claim would circumvent this limitation, thereby frustrating one of the essential features of the Veterans Benefits Act." Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2059.

We conclude that Stencil is not binding precedent on the issue of whether the VBA is the exclusive remedy for servicemen injured while acting incident to military service. First, that issue was not expressly before the Court in Stencel. The third-party claimant in Stencel merely argued that "it may be fair to prohibit direct recovery by servicemen under the Act, since they are assured of compensation regardless of fault under the Veterans Benefits Act." Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672, 97 S.Ct. at 2058 (emphasis added). Moreover, as the dissent in Stencel noted, "the Veterans Benefits Act does not even contain an explicit declaration that it is the exclusive remedy against the

Government for a serviceman's injury." Stencel, 431 U.S. at 675, 97 S.Ct. at 206. (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Most recently in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 202, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 1040, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[w]e affirmed the dismissal of Stencel's cross-claim even though no limitation of liability statute applied to the case, because we found that the limitation of liability principle of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 95 L.Ed. 152, 71 S.Ct. 153 (1950), precluded Stencel's indemnity claim." Thus, as Lockheed explains, the Stencel discussion of the VBA relates only to the VBA as a Feres factor or a "special factor" under the first Bivens exceptions. The Stencel discussion of the VBA is not relevant to an analysis of the VBA as a sufficiently adequate alternative remedy to preclude a Bivens claim under the

second exception to Bivens. We relied upon Lockheed in concluding in Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir. 1985), that "[t]he VBA . . . is best regarded as an additional reason for barring a claim [under the FTCA] based on an injury which is already determined to be 'incident to service,' rather than a dispositive factor [barring the FTCA claim]." Similarly, we hold that the VBA is not a sufficiently adequate alternative to a Bivens action to bar Stanley's claim.

II. FTCA Claim

In the previous appeal, the former Fifth Circuit held that Stanley's claim against the government under the FTCA was barred under the Feres doctrine because "Stanley was engaged in activities incident to his military service at the time his injuries arose." Stanley I, 639 F.2d at 1150. Stanley I established the "law of the case"

on Stanley's pre-discharge claim against the government under the FTCA.

Under the "law of the case" doctrine, an appellate court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case. Dorsey v. Continental Casualty Co., 730 F.2d 675, 678 (11th Cir. 1984). In three instances federal courts have the power to reopen issues that have been previously decided on appeal: (1) when the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, (2) when controlling authority has since made a contrary decison of the law applicable to the issue, or (3) when the previous decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Westbrook v. Zant, 743 F.2d 764, 768-69 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1967)).

The second exception to the "law of the

case" doctrine is applicable in this case. The former Fifth Circuit's conclusion that Stanley's FTCA action against the government was barred under the Feres doctrine was premised solely upon its finding that Stanley was acting incident to military service at the time of the incident alleged. The former Fifth Circuit did not proceed to the next level of inquiry to determine whether the considerations underlying the Feres doctrine militated against permitting Stanley to bring the FTCA claim. The former Fifth Circuit did not, however, have the benefit of Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985), and Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873, reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir. 1985).

The plaintiff in Johnson was the personal representative of the estate of a serviceman who was killed when his helicopter crashed into the side of a mountain. The

plaintiff's complaint alleged that the negligence of civilian Federal Aviation Administration air traffic controllers was the proximate cause of the serviceman's death.

Despite the fact that Johnson presented an atypical Feres situation in that the alleged tort-feasors were civilians, we proceeded to examine the policy which pervades each of the Feres considerations. Our examination was to determine whether the Feres doctrine should be extended to preclude an action where the alleged tort-feasor is not a member of the armed forces or a civilian employee engaged in activities usually associated with the armed forces. Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1538-39 n.6, 1540-42 (citing Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 599 n.51, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

In Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d at 877 n. 11, we interpreted Johnson as

requiring the case-by-case analysis where the facts presented are "sufficiently different from the usual Feres-type case." Cole presented the novel issue of the government's liability for a serviceman's death where the incident which gave rise to the serviceman's death occurred while the serviceman was engaged in activity incident to his military service, but the government's alleged duty to warn arose after the serviceman's discharge. In Cole it was after the discharge that the government's knowledge concerning the hazards to which the serviceman had been exposed substantially increased. We concluded that the facts in Cole were so novel that it was both "necessary and instructive" to evaluate each of the considerations underlying the Feres doctrine in order to properly address the plaintiffs' claim. Cole at 877.

Subsequent to our decision in Cole, we granted the government's suggestion that

Johnson be reviewed by the en banc court. Johnson v. United States, 760 F.2d 244 (11th Cir. 1985). Relying on United States v. Shearer, ____ U.S. ____, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), also decided after Cole, we upheld the panel's decision and reinstated its opinion. Johnson v. United States, 779 F.2d 1492, 1493 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Shearer involved the kidnap and murder of one serviceman by another while both were off duty and away from their bases. The decedent's mother brought an action under the FTCA alleging that the Army knew that the murderer was dangerous and negligently failed to control or warn others about him.

Although the Court held the claims barred because they "struck at the core" of the concerns underlying Feres, the Chief Justice stated that:

> [t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and

subsequent cases.

Shearer, ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 3043, 87 L.Ed.2d at 44.

We hold that under Johnson, Cole, and Shearer, this case requires the case-by-case analysis to determine whether the purpose of the Feres doctrine would be served by precluding Stanley's FTCA claim against the government.

Since the former Fifth Circuit's ruling in Stanley I, controlling authority in the Eleventh Circuit has made a contrary decision of the law applicable to the Stanley facts. Today, in the Eleventh Circuit, controlling precedent does not automatically or mechanically preclude Stanley's lawsuit under the FTCA or Bivens upon a finding that he suffered the complained of injury while performing duties incident to military activities. The interpretation of the Feres doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit is far

different from the interpretation of the Feres doctrine in the former Fifth Circuit. As the Feres doctrine is presently applied in the Eleventh Circuit, Stanley may have a cause of action for injuries inflicted before his discharge. Likewise, even as Stanley I held, recent precedent in this circuit, Johnson and Cole, provide Stanley with the possibility of a cause of action under both the FTCA and Bivens for events occurring after his discharge. Consistent with the recent analysis of the Feres considerations in this circuit, we hold that neither Stanley's cause of action against the government under the FTCA nor his action against the federal officials and civilians under Bivens is necessarily barred by the Feres doctrine

On remand, the district court should allow Stanley the opportunity to amend to plead consistent with recent precedent.

III. Statutory Civil Rights Claims

The appellants urge us to consider Stanley's statutory civil rights claims on the merits, even though those claims have not yet been addressed by the district court. We decline to do so. Not only have those claims not been addressed by the district court, but they are also beyond the scope of the issue for which we certified this interlocutory appeal.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court's judgment that Stanley's complaint states a cause of action against the appellants under Bivens and reverse the judgment that Stanley's FTCA

action against the government is barred by Feres.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 84-5273

JAMES B. STANLEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
JOSEPH R. BERTINO, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

JUNE 17, 1986

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion April 21, 11 Cir.,
1986, 786 F.2d 1490).

Before HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON*, Senior Circuit Judge, and ALLGOOD**, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED and no member of this panel nor other Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh Circuit Rule 26), the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/

Joseph W. Hatchett
United States Circuit Judge

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*See Rule 3(b), Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

** Honorable Clarence W. Allgood, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
S.D. FLORIDA, N.D.

No. 78-8141-CIV-JAG.

JAMES B. STANLEY, PLAINTIFF

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

October 15, 1982

Opinion Vacated November 9, 1982
See 522 F.Supp. 619

ORDER

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE has come before the Court upon the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has considered the motion, and has heard extensive oral argument by counsel.

The case involves the secret administration of LSD to members of the U.S. Army as part of an Army experiment.

In 1958 plaintiff was a Master Sergeant in the United States Army stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Plaintiff volunteered to participate in a program at the Chemical Warfare Laboratories at the Army Chemical Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. The purpose of the program allegedly was the development and testing of methods of defense against chemical warfare attack, including the testing of various gas masks and protective clothing.

During interviews with military and civilian personnel at Edgewood Arsenal, plaintiff was asked to drink a clear liquid which, unknown to him, contained lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Plaintiff unknowingly ingested this drug on four

separate occasions. Plaintiff alleges that as a result he experienced severe reactions including hallucination. When he returned to active duty at Fort Knox a month later he maintains he was in an altered behavioral and emotional state.

Plaintiff was discharged from the Army in 1969 still unaware that he had ingested LSD years earlier. In December, 1975, he received a letter from the Department of the Army, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, soliciting his participation in a follow-up study of the subjects of the 1958 LSD experiments. It was then that he first became aware that he had secretly been given LSD in 1958 by Army personnel.

In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that the defendants deliberately gave him false information regarding the true nature of the program he volunteered to participate in. He further alleges that the

Defendants were grossly negligent in failing to debrief and inform him of the 1958 episode upon his discharge, and in failing to continue to monitor his condition subsequent to his discharge. Plaintiff seeks damages for this allegedly negligent conduct.

The original complaint in this case was based on the same set of facts and consisted of claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b) and 2671, et seq. The question of this court's jurisdiction over those claims was first raised on a motion for summary judgment. This court granted said motions on the basis of the doctrine announced in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950). The Feres doctrine provides that "the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or

are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159.

Upon review of that ruling, the Fifth Circuit concluded that this court's application of the Feres doctrine to preclude the claims brought in the original complaint was correct, but that this court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (1981). Rather, the Fifth Circuit held that the proper disposition of the case was dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit then remanded the case for the trial court's consideration of any amendment that the plaintiff might offer to cure the jurisdictional defect. Id. at 1159-60.

The first question now presented upon the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is whether Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states a cause of action under the

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) not barred by the Feres doctrine.

The defendant argues that the Fifth Circuit, in Stanley, precluded any question of whether Stanley could allege a cause of action under the FTCA.

Although the court finds that the Fifth Circuit left the door open to Stanley to amend his complaint to allege facts sufficient to support a post-discharge tort theory, (so his claims could fall outside the Feres doctrine pursuant to Thornwell v. United States) the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to allege a distinct tort arising entirely post-discharge. See Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979). (Feres doctrine does not bar claims arising from conduct occurring entirely post-discharge).

The court reaches this conclusion by examining the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit

and its reliance on Schnurman v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 429 (E.D.Va.1980). Stanley, 639 F.2d at 1155.

In Schnurman, the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of his exposure to toxic mustard gases during a United States Navy experiment in which he participated while an apprentice seaman. The Schnurman court granted the defendant's renewed motion to dismiss at the end of the trial finding (a) that the plaintiff's injuries were not shown to be caused in any way by the Government's failure to treat plaintiff subsequent to discharge; or (b) by the Government's failure to warn him of the true nature of the gas to which he had been exposed. There was no testimony that his injuries were in any way aggravated or multiplied by the Government's alleged post-discharge negligence, or that follow-up treatment could have avoided any long-term effects of the exposure.

Schnurman, 490 F.Supp. at 437. The Schnurman court found no evidence of any casual connection between the plaintiff's injury and the Government's alleged post-discharge negligence, and held that to allow recovery for the defendants' failure to monitor and treat injuries which resulted from an in-service tort (for which there is no recovery) would leave very little of Feres immunity. Id.

Plaintiff Stanley's Amended Complaint alleges that "Upon and subsequent to Plaintiff's discharge from the army in 1969 Defendants were grossly negligent in failing to debrief and inform Plaintiff of the [LSD experiment] and in failing to continue to monitor his condition..." and that he suffers continuing and permanent psychological injuries as a result of Defendant's negligent failure to debrief him and to continue to monitor his condition. The Plaintiff does

not causally connect the injuries resulting from the experiment with any conduct occurring in its entirety after Plaintiff's discharge. Although Plaintiff omits allegations of predischarge negligence in his Amended Complaint the court is not persuaded that the acts constituting the alleged negligence were separate and distinct from any acts occurring before discharge, so as to give rise to a separate actionable tort not barred by the Feres doctrine.

The court, therefore, concludes that plaintiff's claims under the FTCA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Stanley, including its reliance on Schnurman v. United States.

The Amended Complaint also alleges constitutional claims based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29

L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). While the court recognizes that a Bivens cause of action is available against individual officers and agents of the Government, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars an action against the United States itself.

The question of whether a Bivens cause of action can be brought against the Government was addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979). In Jaffee, plaintiff claimed damages for injuries suffered as a result of radiation exposure while serving in the United States Army when assigned to participate in nuclear testing. The court, after concluding that Jaffee's claim could not be brought under the FTCA because of the Feres doctrine, proceeded to consider whether a cause of action could

be brought against the Government pursuant to Bivens.

> Alternatively, Jaffee urges that this court can create an exception to the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] in order to grant relief for deliberate violation of constitutional rights. For authority supporting this argument, he turns to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and to Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). In Bivens the Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers who had violated the fourth amendment. Butz held that certain federal executive officials did not enjoy an absolute immunity for the damage suits permitted by Bivens. From these cases Jaffee tries to extract the principle that "the applicable common law doctrine of governmental immunity must yield to the paramount necessity of vindicating constitutional guarantees." But the suits in Bivens and Butz were against individual federal officers and not against the United States. Because Jaffee has sued the Government itself, Bivens and Butz do not afford him a traversable bridge across the moat of sovereign immunity.

Jaffee, 592 F.2d 712, 717 (footnotes omitted). This court finds, therefore, that the plaintiff's Bivens claims herein cannot be maintained against the Government itself.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss also attacks the Bivens-type claims brought against the Unknown Individual Federal Agents and Officers. Defendants first argue that fictitious individual defendants are not proper parties. This argument is without merit. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 102 S.Ct. 2234, 72 L.Ed.2d 845 (1982).

Defendants next argue that even if plaintiff has properly pled a Bivens cause of action against individual agents and officers, such claim is barred by the Feres doctrine.

The Feres case itself dealt exclusively with claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Feres v. United States, 340

U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152. It did not address Bivens-type actions.

At least one United States Court of Appeals has held that although a claim against the Government under the FTCA may be barred by the Feres doctrine, a Bivens claim against individuals arising from the same set of facts is not barred by Feres. See Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981). This court likewise holds that the Feres doctrine does not bar plaintiff's claims against the individual agents and officers.

The defendants also attack the Amended Complaint on the ground that the claims against the individual defendants are time-barred. They contend that the applicable statute of limitations, the four-year period for actions involving negligent and intentional torts, Fla. Stat. §95.11(3)(a) and (o), began to run in 1975 when plaintiff was first informed that he had been given

LSD. Because the original complaint did not name individual defendants, defendants argue that the Amended Complaint cannot relate back to the original complaint as regards the individuals.

It is unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of relation-back. At the time plaintiff filed his original complaint the Fifth Circuit held a restrictive position as to causes of action brought pursuant to Bivens. Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d at 1156 n. 12; see Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (no right of action may be implied from the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment). Thus, until the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), Stanley had no Bivens cause of action. As a result, the claims against the individuals in this case, which are based primarily on the Fifth Amendment,

did not accrue until the Supreme Court's decision in 1979. It follows, therefore, that the claims against the individual officers and agents set forth in the Amended Complaint are not time-barred. See United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972) (Because appellant had no reasonable probability of successfully prosecuting his claim prior to the enunciation of a new rule by the United States Supreme Court, for statute of limitations purposes the cause of action accrued on the date of the Supreme Court's decision); United States v. LePatourel, 593 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1979).

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff's claim does not rise to one of constitutional magnitude, and counsels the court to exercise hesitation in recognizing a Bivens cause of action. Defendants characterize plaintiff's claim as "nothing

more than a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent and negligent follow-up care."

The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that there is a constitutional right to be free to decide for oneself whether to submit to drug therapy. Mills v. Rogers, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982). Although it is difficult to locate the exact constitutional source of this right, courts have recognized it as a liberty or privacy interest associated with the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal security. See Mills v. Rogers, ___ U.S. at ___ & n. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 2447 & n. 7. This right to be free from the unwanted administration of drugs has also been associated with First Amendment rights because "the power to produce ideas is fundamental to our cherished right to communicate..." See Mills v. Rogers, ___

U.S. at _____ n. 3, 102 S.Ct. at 2446 n.3.

This court views the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint as an egregious intrusion on the most precious right protected by the Constitution -- the right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The surreptitious administration of LSD to an unwitting serviceman who believes he is involved in a project important to the development of defenses to chemical warfare constitutes a violation of the rights of privacy and bodily integrity, and of the right of an individual to control his mind, his private thoughts and his intellectual process.

It is ludicrous to suggest that such an intrusion upon a person by the federal government does not rise to a claim of constitutional magnitude, but is merely a medical malpractice claim.

In Mills v. Rogers, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that the unwanted administration of drug therapy by a state hospital to mental patients warranted constitutional scrutiny to determine whether the state's competing interests outweigh the individual's constitutionally protected interest in being free from such conduct. ___ U.S. at ____, 102 S.Ct. at 2447. The deplorable nature of such conduct is multiplied by the facts in this case. The LSD was administered to the plaintiff by agents of the same government that guarantees the plaintiff his personal right to be free from such conduct, and whose constitutional duty it is to protect such personal interests. Moreover, it is the same government that lured the plaintiff into believing he was playing an important role in the defense of that government, and for which he presumably was acting out of an extreme

sense of loyalty and duty. The conduct alleged in this case would shock -- if not outrage -- the conscience of any court, and is most certainly protected against by the Constitution of the United States.

Although the Court recognizes that the military relationship between Stanley and the officers and agents involved in the LSD experiments must be weighed against the individual's constitutional rights in order to determine whether a cause of action is maintainable in this case, the court cannot legally or morally find that relationship sufficient to overcome the liberty and privacy rights guaranteed by the Constitution. To do so would deprive the plaintiff and all military personnel similarly situated of any recourse against the government or its agents, and thus would deprive them of their most fundamental civil rights.

In summary, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. That as to the claims against the Government brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Motion to Dismiss be and the same is hereby GRANTED.

2. That as to the claims against the Government brought pursuant to Bivens, the Motion to Dismiss be and the same is hereby GRANTED.

3. That as to the claims against the UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL FEDERAL AGENTS AND OFFICERS, the Motion to Dismiss be and the same is hereby DENIED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), the Court finds that this Order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation. Furthermore, should either of the parties file a Notice of Appeal of this Order, there shall be a stay of the proceedings in this cause until further Order of the Court.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
S.D. FLORIDA, N.D.

Civ. A. No. 78-8141-CIV-JAG

JAMES B. STANLEY, PLAINTIFF

V.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES ARMY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL FEDERAL AGENTS AND OFFICERS, DEFENDANTS

Nov. 9, 1982

ORDER

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

This matter having been opened to the Court by the United States' Motion For Partial Final Judgment and Suggestion Of Interest.

And the Court having considered the United States' Motion for Partial Final

Judgment and Suggestion Of Interest, and further, having reviewed the United States' previously-filed Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Opposition thereto, and further, having reconsidered this Court's Order of October 15, 1982, 549 F.Supp. 327,

And the Court having found and determined that the United States' Motion For Partial Final Judgment and Suggestion Of Interest are well taken,

IT IS on this 9th day of November, 1982, ORDERED:

That there is no just reason for delay in expressly directing the entry of judgment in favor of the United States and that such relief is HEREBY GRANTED and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter final judgment in favor of the United States forthwith, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that this Court's October 15, 1982 Order ruling on plaintif's claims against individual defendants is hereby vacated and withdrawn; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that unless plaintiff identifies and serves at least one individual defendant by his correct name within ninety (90) days, claims against individual defendants shall be dismissed on the Court's own motion.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
S.D. FLORIDA, N.D.

No. 78-8141-CIV-JAG.

JAMES B. STANLEY, PLAINTIFF

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Oct. 28, 1983.

ORDER

GONZALEZ, District Judge

I

THIS CAUSE has come before the court for review sua sponte upon the issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Chappell v. Wallace, ____ U.S. ____, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), and upon counsel for the plaintiff's letter to the court and the plaintiff's response to the previously filed

motions to dismiss. In light of all of the foregoing, the court finds it necessary to clarify its prior opinion denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, Stanley v. United States, et al. (Stanley II), 549 F.Supp. 327 (S.D. Fla. 1982) and the application of the Supreme Court's opinion in Chappell to that decision.

This case involves the secret administration of LSD to the plaintiff, a member of the United States Army, as part of an Army experiment.

In 1958, the plaintiff James Stanley was a Master Sergeant in the United States Army stationed in Fort Knox, Kentucky. Stanley volunteered to participate in a program at the Chemical Warfare Laboratories at the Army Chemical Center, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. The purpose of the program allegedly was the development and testing of methods of defense against chemi-

cal warfare attack, including the testing of various gas masks and protective clothing.

During interviews with military and civilian personnel at Edgewood Arsenal, Stanley was asked to drink a clear liquid which, unknown to him, contained lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).[1] Stanley alleges that he suffered severe reactions, including hallucinations, as a result of ingesting the LSD. When he returned to active duty at Fort Knox a month later, he maintains that he was in an altered behavioral and emotional state.[2]

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[1] Stanley's allegation that the military surreptitiously administered LSD to him, if true, clearly demonstrates "that his constitutional rights have been violated." Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 962 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming dismissal by this court of Bivens action brought by drug informer against United States and individual members of marshal's service). The source of the plaintiff's Bivens action in the instant case is the Fifth Amendment right to be free to decide for oneself whether to submit to drug therapy. Stanley II, 549 F.Supp. at 331 (relying on Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982)). (cont'd)

Stanley continued to serve his country in the Army for eleven years, all the while completely unaware of the wrong knowingly perpetrated against him. In 1969, the Army discharged Mr. Stanley without informing him that he had ingested LSD years earlier. In December 1975, Stanley received a letter from the Department of the Army, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, soliciting his participation in a follow-up study of the subjects of the 1958 LSD experiments. Only then did Mr. Stanley learn that the Army had secretly administered LSD to him in 1958.

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[2] Stanley alleges that following completion of the Army's LSD testing, he periodically became incoherent and subjected his family to physical abuse, often not recalling these events afterwards. He further maintains that the LSD impaired his performance of military duties, prompting a reduction in his service rank. Amended Complaint ¶ 5 (filed Apr. 29, 1981). Stanley also claims that the dissolution of his marriage in 1970 was primarily due to the psychological problems that have plagued him since his encounter with LDS Id. ¶ 8.

The original complaint in this case consisted of claims brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or the "Act"), Pub.L. No. 601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).[3] The question of this court's jurisdiction over those claims was first raised on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. This court granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis of the doctrine announced in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950). The Feres doctrine provides that "the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to

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[3] The Act waived the United States Government's sovereign immunity for the torts of its employees by granting the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits for damages "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).

service." Id. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159.

Upon review of that ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that this court's application of the Feres doctrine to preclude the claims brought in the original complaint was correct, but that this court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment. Stanley v. CIA (Stanley I), 639 F.2d 1146 (1981). Rather, the Fifth Circuit held, the proper disposition of the case was dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals then remanded the case for the trial court's consideration of any amendment that the plaintiff might offer to cure the jurisdictional defect.

The plaintiff then amended his complaint[4] and, in addition to the original allegations that the defendants gave him false information regarding the program in which he participated, he also alleged that the defendants were grossly negligent in failing to debrief and inform him of the 1958 episode upon his discharge, and in failing to continue to monitor his condition subsequent to his discharge. The plaintiff seeks damages for this allegedly negligent conduct.

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[4] Plaintiff's original complaint named as defendants the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Department of Defense, and the United States Army. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to name as defendants the United States Government and unknown individual federal agents and officers. Amended Complaint (filed Apr. 29, 1981). A Second Amended Complaint, filed on February 3, 1983, named as defendants several individuals who allegedly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights during and after his service in the Army. These individuals include Joseph R. Bertino, M.D., Board of Regents of the University of Maryland, H.D. Collier, Albert Dreisbach, Bernard G. Eifert, Sidney Gottlieb, M.D., Richard Helms, Gerald Klee, M.D., Van Sim, M.D. and Walter Weintraub.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the Fifth Circuit's opinion precluded the plaintiff from alleging any claim under the FTCA and that the plaintiff could not maintain any cause of action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.1d 619 (1971), because any such claim would also be barred by the FTCA, did not rise to constitutional magnitude, or would be precluded by the applicable statute of limitations.

Heeding the opinion the Fifth Circuit in Stanley I, this court decided that the plaintiff could not plead a statutory (i.e. FTCA) or Bivens-type claim against the Government itself. But this court did hold that Mr. Stanley had a viable Bivens action against individual agents and officers of the United States who participated in the LSD

experiment. Stanley II, 549 F.Supp. at 329-32.[5] It is this last conclusion that the court finds necessary to reaffirm at this time.

In concluding that the plaintiff has a viable cause of action based on Bivens against the individual defendants, the court rejected the defendants' argument that any Bivens claim also was barred by the Feres doctrine. Id. at 330. The court cited the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), in support of its theory that although a claim against the government under the FTCA may be barred by the Feres doctrine, a Bivens cause of action arising from the same set of facts, against

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[5] Although the Fifth Circuit did not express an opinion on the merits of the plaintiff's amended pleadings, it did find "that Stanley has at least a colorable constitutional claim based on Bivens. . . ." Stanley I, 639 F.2d at 1159.

individuals, is not necessarily barred by Feres. The Supreme Court now having reversed the Ninth Circuit in Chappell v. Wallace, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), it has been suggested that the plaintiff no longer has a viable cause of action based on Bivens. The task before this court is to decide if Chappell is controlling in the instant case, and whether the exceptions to a Bivens action preclude the plaintiff's claims against federal officers.

II.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), established that the victim of a constitutional violation by a federal officer has the right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right; the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars a similar action

against the United States itself. Stanley II, 549 F.Supp. at 330 (relying on Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979)).[6] The Bivens cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 91 S.Ct. at 2004; see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1471, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 965 (5th Cir. 1982). The second is when defendants prove that Congress has provided an alternative remedy

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[6] See, e.g., Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268-69 (8th Cir. 1982); Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 393-94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003, 99 S.Ct. 613, 58 L.Ed.2d 678 (1978); Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850, 852 (2d Cir. 1976).

which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005; see Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18, 100 S.Ct. at 1471; Garcia, 666 F.2d at 965.

The Bivens action arose out of the need to deter federal officers from violating a citizen's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court recognized that absent a constitutional remedy, complainants would have no other form of judicial relief from federal abuses. Creation of the Bivens action was consistent with the traditional view that "damages . . . [be] recognized as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395, 91 S.Ct. at 2004.

In Chappell v. Wallace, the Supreme Court reviewed the propriety of a Bivens action arising out of an intramilitary dispute. The Court held that "the unique disci-

plinary structure of the military establishment and Congress' activity in the [military] field constitute 'special factors' which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers." ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2367.

This court strongly believes that the Chappell decision has no effect whatsoever on the plaintiff's ability to maintain a cause of action arising from the facts of the instant case. Although the court relied on Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), to support the reasoning in its prior ruling that Mr. Stanley has a valid Bivens claim, the plaintiff's cause of action is in no way dependent upon that opinion, nor is his claim precluded by the Supreme Court's reversal of that decision. The court finds that the facts of this case are distinguishable from Chappell, and although the Supreme

Court has now substantially limited the availability of a Bivens action in cases to which the Feres doctrine may be applicable, the Court has not totally barred Bivens actions by servicemen for torts committed against them during their term of service.

III.

In Chappell v. Wallace, ____ U.S. ____, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), five enlisted men serving aboard a combat naval vessel brought a Bivens action against their commanding officer and various other superior officers. The complaint alleged that because of their minority race, the defendants failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity. For these transgressions, the plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed plaintiff's complaint, holding that the actions complained of were nonreviewable military decisions, that the naval officers were entitled to immunity, and that the enlisted men had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the naval practices complained of were reviewable, and that the officers in question enjoyed only qualified immunity from suit. Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981). The court of appeals concluded that the Feres doctrine does not bar a Bivens action and, therefore, enlisted men could bring a constitutional claim against the naval officers involved. Id. at 735-36 & n.9.

The Supreme Court of the United States sided with the district court and reversed the appellate court's decision. The Court found that the Feres doctrine's underlying policy of protecting military discipline constituted a "special factor" that precluded a Bivens action. ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2367. In a sweeping concluding statement, the Court held that "enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior for alleged constitutional violations." Id. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2368. Significantly, however, the Chief Justice, limited the scope of the Court's decision, declaring that "[t]his Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service." Id. at _____, 103 S.Ct. at 2367 (emphasis added).

The obvious import of the Court's qualified holding is to limit the Chappell decision to its facts. Because the Supreme Court explicitly refrained from precluding all civil actions by military personnel for constitutional wrongs committed during their service, and because the Court found it necessary to determine whether there were special factors present in the facts of Chappell which militated against finding a Bivens cause of action, this court concludes that the Supreme Court's blanket statement stripping military personnel of their right to maintain an action against superior officers bars only those actions in which the same "special factors" are present, i.e., a case in which a member of the military brings a suit against a superior officer for wrongs; which involve direct orders in the performance of military duty and the discipline and order necessary thereto.

A

The first exception to a Bivens action is the existence of "special factors counselling hesitation." The Chappell Court considered the need for military discipline to be just such a "special factor." Traditionally, courts have not interfered with intramilitary disputes because they lack the requisite competency and because such intermeddling would threaten the legitimacy of military orders. ___ U.S. at ___ - ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2365-67. The Supreme Court noted the "peculiar and special relationship" of the soldier to his superiors and observed that the rights of military personnel must give way to the overriding demands of discipline and duty. Id at ____, 103 S.Ct. at 2365. The Court explained that this is not only true in a combat situation, but also true in the training that precedes combat, so that immediate obedience to military proce-

dures and orders can become so ingrained that it becomes reflexive. Id. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Chappell Court refused to allow the enlisted men to recover damages from their superior officers for alleged constitutional violations, because the acts complained of occurred during the course and performance of the plaintiffs' duties as military personnel.

This court is well aware of the compelling need to protect military discipline in order to ensure the execution of military orders. However, the plaintiff's Bivens action in the instant case neither involves nor threatens to compromise military discipline. The case does not involve a combat or combat-training situation; it does not involve any exigent circumstances; and it is not a case in which the plaintiff was either ordered or obligated to participate in a military exercise. Rather, this is a case in

which the Army sought volunteers to test equipment, and the plaintiff volunteered his participation, in service to his country.[7]

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[7] In a prior decision in the instant case, Stanley I, 639 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit attempted to minimize the significance of Mr. Stanley's volunteer status by citing fifteen cases in which courts dismissed a serviceman's action against the Government or individuals although he was volunteering for the activity which caused his injury. This court has reviewed each of the fifteen cases cited by the Fifth Circuit in support of this holding, id. at 1150, and finds that they are distinguishable from the case at bar. In almost every case, the plaintiff has sued the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which this court finds distinguishable from a constitutional cause of action brought against individuals pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. In the few cases in which the plaintiff did bring an action against individuals for violation of his constitutional rights, the actions were either based on the FTCA, Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979), dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction without further analysis, id., concerned with military discipline in a different context, Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F.Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1979((relying on Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948, 86 S.Ct. 1205, 16 L.Ed.2d 210 (1966), or failed to consider the Bivens (cont'd)

Had civilians been eligible to participate in the program, this case could easily have involved a person not a member of the military. In sum, applying the Chappell Court's own standard, this is not a case involving "[t]he special nature of military life, [or] the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel. . . ." ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2367.

The factual posture of the instant case clearly distinguishes it from several other appellate decisions which have reached a different result. The two most notable are Gaspard v. United States, 544 F.Supp. 55 (E.D. La. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), and Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).[8]

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decision, Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975).

[8] The Gaspard and Jaffee decisions, as products of the Fifth and Third Circuits, respectively, are neither binding nor con-
(cont'd)

Gaspard and Jaffee are basically identical in factual design and result. In both cases, former servicemen and their wives sued the United States and various named and unnamed federal officers for violating their constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that during the Army's atomic testing in the 1950's, their superior officers knowingly ordered them to purposely expose themselves to atomic fallout.[9] Years

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trolling precedent on this court or the Eleventh Circuit. See Hill v. Linahan, 697 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376, 1384 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982); Baker, Primer on Precedent, 34 Mercer L.Rev. 1175, 1185-89 (1983). As a case of first impression, Stanley offers the Eleventh Circuit an opportunity to define more clearly the interplay between the Bivens action and the Feres doctrine, and to demonstrate how underlying factual variations in the Bivens claim produce different results.

[9] Gaspard, 713 F.2d at 1099 ("The troops at Desert Rock [including Mr. Gaspard] typically were ordered into open trenches shortly before each atomic blast. After the initial shock waves passed, they were ordered to march within 1,000 yards of 'ground zero.'"); Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1229 (The plaintiff and others "were ordered by their commanding officers to stand in a field (cont'd)

later, the plaintiffs suffered a host of medical maladies, most of which they attributed to the in-service radiation exposures. The plaintiffs' Bivens claims soon followed.

Both the Fifth and Third Circuits dismissed the Bivens actions, holding that money damages may not be assessed against the military or its officers if the suit jeopardized military discipline and if there existed an exclusive statutory remedy. Essentially, the courts found that under the specific facts alleged, the rationale of the Feres doctrine barred the Bivens claims.[10]

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without benefit of any protection against radiation while a nuclear device was exploded a short distance away.")

[10] After Chappell v. Wallace, U.S. ____, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), there can be little doubt that the impact of the Feres doctrine on a Bivens action is fact-specific. Indeed, the Gaspard court acknowledged that "[i]t is 'crystal clear' that Bivens claims are distinct from FTCA actions, and the Feres bar therefore does not automatically preclude the Bivens claim." 713 F.2d at 1102 (citations and footnote omitted); see infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. Only because of the (cont'd)

The result in Gaspard and Jaffee is understandable because the soldiers there "were on active duty status at the time of [the atomic testing], in uniform, and subject to military orders and discipline." Gaspard, 713 F.2d at 1099 (emphasis added).[11] Significantly, however, the plaintiff in the instant case did not participate in the Army's testing program because a superior officer ordered him to do so; instead -- to reiterate -- he volunteered. Unlike the soldiers in Gaspard and Jaffee, [sic] who could have left the atomic testing site only upon penalty of insubordination, Mr. Stanley could have freely withdrawn from the Army's LSD experiments. In no way, then, does the

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nature of the facts presented in Gaspard did the court of appeals decide that the Feres doctrine barred the plaintiffs Bivens claims. Id. at 1103.

[11] In one passage, the Gaspard court explained that the Feres doctrine would bar a Bivens claim if the action would "obstruct necessary military orders." 713 F.2d at 1103 n.12 (emphasis added).

instant case require the court to inquire into the propriety of military orders. Therefore, the single most compelling reason for extending the Feres doctrine to Bivens claims against military officers, and the basis for the Chappell decision, is not controlling in the case at bar.

Even if military discipline was somehow tangentially affected by this court's decision, there exists ample commonlaw and statutory authority to support judicial review of the plaintiff Stanley's constitutional review of the plaintiff Stanley's constitutional claim. First, complaints by military personnel, which are encouraged by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. §938 (1975)[12] are judicially reviewable.[13].

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[12] Article 138, 10 U.S.C.A. § 938, provides:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior commissioned (cont'd)

Second, military officials have traditionally

officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made.

[13] Colson v. Bradley, 477 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1973) (court stayed officer's discharge and granted mandamus relief to afford him review of his low efficiency report); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Our reluctance . . . to review discretionary military orders does not imply that any action by the Army, even one violative of its own regulations, is beyond the reach of the courts."); Cushing v. Tetter, 478 F. Supp. 960 (D.R.I. 1979) (naval enlistee properly failed to resort to remedies under Uniform Code of Military Justice before seeking federal judicial relief from order that he return to military unit); Hickey v. Commandant of Fourth Naval Dist., 461 F.Supp. 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (naval reservist entitled to judicial review of Secretary's order calling reservist to active duty upon his disenrollment from Naval ROTC).

Judicial decisions over the last quarter century demonstrate that there is no broad barrier to judicial review of military matters. For example, the federal courts have greatly expanded their review of military court-martial proceedings. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 745, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 1305, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579,582, 78 S.Ct. 433,435, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958); Scott v. Schlesinger, 498 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Blackwell, 354 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1965). The courts also have reviewed the military's decision to grant or deny inductees conscientious objector status. See (cont'd)

been held accountable in courts of law,[14] and this practice continues today.[15] Third,

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United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Martinez v. Laird, 327 F.Supp. 711 (N.D. Fla. 1971). Most significantly, federal courts are not adverse to reviewing internal military affairs, see Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958) (discharge); Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.1971)(demotion), or examining the constitutionality of military decisions or regulations, see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (freedom of speech); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953) (due process); Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864, 102 S.Ct. 324, 70 L.Ed.2d 164 (1981) (due process and equal protection); Priest v. Secretary of Navy, 570 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (freedom of speech); Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974) (right to counsel); United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1971) (freedom of speech).

[14] See Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 389, 13 L.Ed. 1036 (1851) (marine can sue his commanding officer for alleged unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment); Little v. Bareme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 2 L.Ed. 243 (1804) (commander of U.S. warship liable for damages for unlawful seizure of neutral vessel even though acting on orders of President).

[15] See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (habeas corpus review of court martial); Parisi v. (cont'd)

military officers are subject to only qualified immunity,[16] albeit this immunity is granted if military discipline would be deleteriously affected by judicial interference. See Chappell, ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 1265-66.

In conclusion, by donning a uniform, a member of the Army does not volunteer himself

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Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972) (serviceman who had applied for discharge as a conscientious objector and had exhausted administrative remedies was entitled to seek habeas corpus relief in federal court); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969) (review and reversal of lower courts denial of habeas corpus relief for soldier charged with nonservice connected wrongdoing); see cases cited supra note 13.

[16] See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (Governor, senior and subordinate officers of state National Guard, and state university president not absolutely immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for military steps taken in alleged suppression of student dissent over Vietnam War); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (high ranking military officials who were charged with violating serviceman's fifth amendment rights held not immune from suit); infra note 26 and accompanying text.

to be duped and deceived into becoming a guinea pig for his superiors, and consequently to be deprived of his most fundamental constitutional and human rights. The "peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors" does not permit the violation of those fundamental rights in a situation that does not involve military discipline and duty. Furthermore, although the special status of the military has required the establishment of two systems of justice, one for civilians and the other for military personnel, both must operate within the confines of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. As explained in Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979), a case almost identical to the one at bar:[17]

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[17] Plaintiff Thornwell was a former service man who sued the United States and his former military superiors for injuries which he sustained after the Army intentionally administrated LSD to him without his knowledge as part of their interrogation. The plaintiff charged, inter alia, that the (cont'd)

> To hold that the military may deprive a civilian of his constitutional rights merely because the deprivation originated when the civilian was an enlisted man would be tantamount to declaring all veterans second class citizens. Men and women who have served in our Armed Forces, and to whom this nation is indebted beyond measurement, are certainly entitled to the constitutional liberties afforded all citizens. In short, if the military deprives a veteran of his constitutional rights, it may not look to Feres for immunity.

Id. at 353 (footnote omitted).

B

The Chappell Court, by its own admission,[18] relies on the Feres doctrine policy of protecting military discipline to bar a Bivens action. Although a small

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federal officers violated his fifth amendment due process rights by concealing the drugging and failing to provide him with follow-up medical treatment. As to this count, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff's allegations stated a valid Bivens-type cause of action. 471 F.Supp. at 355.

[18] ". . . the Court's analysis in Feres guides our analysis of this case." ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2365.

portion of the opinion intimates that the Court is sensitive to the difference between a statutory and a constitutional cause of action,[19] the decision's overall analysis appears to belie this view. Statutory and constitutional actions implicate different immunity concepts, which can sharply alter the complexion of a court's analysis. A Bivens claim raises questions about official immunity, while the principle of sovereign immunity often dictates the result of actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. This court does not interpret Chappell as holding that the law and policy circumscribing statutory actions are controlling herein. Rather, the FTCA, and more specifically the Feres doctrine, merely influence this court's analysis of plaintiff's constitutional claim.

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[19] "[Chappell] concerns the limitations on the type of nonstatutory damage recognized in Bivens, rather than Congress' intent in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act . . ." Id.

To ensure that its position on this important point is clear, the court pauses at this juncture to examine the relationship between the Feres doctrine and the Bivens cause of action.

The Feres doctrine represents a judicial response to Congress' passage of the FTCA. The doctrine prevents members of the armed forces from suing the United States for injuries suffered incident to, or arising out of, military service. There [sic] Feres Court cited several reasons for the doctrine, some of which remain persuasive today. First, the "distinctively federal" nature of the relationship between soldiers and the government means that military personnel should not be subject to variations in state law when seeking relief.[20] Second, claims against the government are unnecessary

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[20] Feres, 340 U.S. at 143, 71 S.Ct. at 158.

because there already exists a comprehensive system for compensating military personnel under the Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1976).[21] Third, suits against the government are barred because of the need for military discipline, which is fosterd by preventing a soldier from questioning the legitimacy and propriety of an order.[22]

Completely distinguishable from a statutory action against the military barred by Feres is a constitutional cause of action based on Bivens. The source of a Bivens

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[21] 340 U.S. at 145, 71 S.Ct. at 159. But cf. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954). In Brown, the Court found that the availability of relief under the Veterans Act, ch. 102, § 31, 48 State. 526 (1934) (current version at 38 U.S.C.A. § 251 (1979)), did not preclude recovery against the Government under the FTCA, too. 348 U.S. at 113, 75 S.Ct. at 144 (reaffirming Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53, 69 S.Ct. 918, 920, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949)).

[22] See, e.g., Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 2058-59, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977).

action is the Constitution; the rights protected therein are among the most valued personal liberties that citizens possess. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long recognized that a citizen has a right to relief when his constitutional rights are violated. As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), "[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists of the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws." The Bivens Court logically extended this principal to include a citizen's right to sue federal officers for alleged violations of the former's constitutional rights. 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005. The federal courts have the power to award damages to a litigant in a Bivens claim absent congressional authorization,[23] and

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[23] Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005. The plain and obvious language of post-Bivens Supreme Court decisions easily (cont'd)

such actions can be implied under the Fifth Amendment.[24]

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dispenses with the Chappell Court's undocumented assertion that federal courts lack the authority to provide damage remedies for constitutional violations in the absence of congressional approval. ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2367. For example, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), a case involving the scope of immunity afforded federal executive officers, Justice White counselled:

> The presence or absence of congressional authorization for suits against federal officials is, of course, relevant to the question whether to infer a right of action for damages for a particular violation of the Constitution.... Absent congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think more carefully about whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages, and whether the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the plaintiff's claim.
>
> But once this analysis is completed, there is no reason to return again to the absence of congressional authorization in resolving the question of immunity.

Id. at 503, 98 S.Ct. at 2909 (citations omitted). Lest there be any doubt that the federal courts can authorize a Bivens remedy when faced with congressional silence, the court urges review of Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398, 91 S.Ct. at 2005; See James v. United States, 358 F.Supp. 1381, 1386-87 (D.R.I. 1973). (cont'd)

In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), which involved a claim by a mother on behalf of her deceased son against federal prison officials who were alleged to have intentionally deprived him of necessary medical care, the Supreme Court recognized another important difference between the Bivens and FTCA actions: the constitutional remedy is more effective. The Court adduced four reasons for this conclusion:

> First, the Bivens remedy, in addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States.
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> . . . .

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[24] Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (action against congressman for sex discrimination); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344, 353-55 (D.D.C. 1979)(military surreptitiously administered LSD to soldier in violation of his fifth amendment rights); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (eighth amendment).

> Second, our decisions . . . indicate that punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit. . . . But punitive damages in an FTCA suit are statutorily prohibited. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Thus FTCA is that much less effective than a Bivens action as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts.
>
> Third, a plaintiff cannot opt for a jury in an FTCA action, 28 U.S.C. § 2402, as he may in a Bivens suit. . . .
>
> Fourth, an action under FTCA exists only if the state in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Yet it is obvious that the liability of federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules.

Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21-23, 100 S.Ct. at 1472-74. Rather than allow federal officials to act beyond the scope of their authority with impunity, the Bivens action checks the exercise of that power and serves as "an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).[25] Because of these differences, the

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[25] Courts critical of the Bivens remedy (cont'd)

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charge that the deterrent value of the action has a "chilling effect" on the exercise of discretionary power by government officials and, therefore, the constitutional action hinders not only improper conduct, but proper conduct, too. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1234 (3d Cir. 1981). Although this criticism has merit in a military setting in which orders must be obeyed reflexively, it has no application where, as here, military discipline is not involved. Instead, the instant case presents a rather straighforward question of whether fundamental constitutional rights take precedence over government discretionary power. This court answers in the affirmative.

Admittedly, in order for government to function properly, its officials must be free to exercise discretionary authority. However, the Framers of the Constitution recognized that discretionary authority left uncontrolled can become oppressive, so they drafted the Bill of Rights to check government power and protect individual liberties. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 1-2, at 3 n.7 (1978) (relying on 14 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1958)). The presumption born of the first ten amendments is that government conduct violative of an individual's constitutionally-protected rights is invalid. Translated into practical terms, this means that in a military setting in which discipline is not relevant, government officers cannot secretly administer drugs to members of the armed forces in violation of their constitutional rights. If the Bivens action has a "chilling effect" on this type of individual conduct, then so be it. After all, no less an authority than the (cont'd)

Extending the Feres analysis to a Bivens claim blurs the distinction between statutory and constitutional actions. Without delineating between the two, a court might grant official immunity to officers in the military based on reasoning that heretofore has sustained only federal sovereign immunity. While sovereign immunity has constitutional underpinnings and is as absolute as Congress may intend, official immunity is judge-made and generally is qualified.[26]

Bill of Rights requires such a result.

[26] Virtually every federal or state officer is subject to qualified immunity. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (state non-judicial officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (governor and officers in National Guard). Although qualified immunity is the rule, the Supreme Court has recognized that there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (state prosecutor); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (state judge); Yaselli (cont'd)

In order to avoid obscuring the concepts of sovereign and official immunity, Chappell counsels that the Feres doctrine "guides," but does not dictate, the outcome of a Bivens action arising out of an intramilitary dispute. The Court reasons that if the Feres doctrine applies, then military officers may be subject to qualified immunity from suit. As explained above, however the Feres doctrine is not controlling in the instant case because the discipline of military subordinates is in no way implicated by the facts. Thus, in holding that the plaintiff's Bivens action is viable, this court is faithful to the rule in Chappell while remining sensitive to the distinction between a statutory and a constitutional cause of action.

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v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927), aff'g 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926) (federal prosecutor); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872) (federal judge).

C

Under the Bivens analysis, the implication of a constitutional cause of action also may be precluded when Congress has explicitly provided an adequate alternative remedy. The Chappell Court devotes little space to this issue; in fact, nowhere in the opinion does the Court even mention this second exception to a Bivens action. The Court does point out, however, that military personnel can bring their complaints before a military tribunal, and that such bodies can award retroactive back pay and promotions. Chappell, ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2367.

Such remedies are meaningless in the instant case. The constitutional wrong complained of by Mr. Stanley is impossible to correct. The plaintiff does not claim that the Army cheated him out of either money or a promotion. Rather, he alleges that the Army

has knowingly deprived him of the ability to appreciate and enjoy his life; that for the past twenty-five years, he has suffered - and continues to suffer - from serious mental illness and severe physical pain. Amended Complaint ¶¶5, 8 (filed Apr. 29, 1981).

Having differentiated between the alternative remedies available in Chappell and the instant case, the court would be content to stop here. However, the need for clarity in this case compels the court to explain in greater detail why no alternative remedies exist that would preclude the plaintiff's Bivens action.

There are two, mutually dependent, elements to the alternative remedy exception. The first element requires proof that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution. Bivens, 203 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005;

see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1472, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2278, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). An essential aspect of this element is that Congress must expressly intend for the alternative remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the Bivens remedy. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1472 n. 5. The second independent requirement for this exception to apply is that the remedial scheme must be equally as effective as the damages action. Id. at 18-19, 100 S.Ct. at 1471-72.

The only alternative remedy that satisfies the first element of the exception is the Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §301 et seq. (1976) ("VBA"). Although the Third and Fifth Circuits have concluded that the VBA preempts a private action against the military for damages based on the Constitution, see Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d

1097 (5th Cir. 1983); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1245-46 (3d Cir. 1981), neither of these decisions applied the Bivens/Carlson analysis.

The Jaffee court fundamentally modified the alternative remedy test by not requiring "an explicit Congressional declaration of the exclusivity of veterans' compensation." 663 F.2d at 1243. In Gaspard, the court ignored the Bivens/Carlson standard altogether. While the Fifth Circuit found the VBA to be an "exclusive" and "comprehensive" remedy, 713 F.2d at 1102, 1105, no consideration was given, as Carlson requires, to whether the statutory claim is "as effective" a remedy as the Bivens action itself. Moreover, the Gaspard court did not find, as Bivens requires, that Congress had "explicitly declared" the VBA to be an exclusive remedy.[27] This court is not prepared to

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[27] The Fifth Circuit has not hesitated (cont'd)

alter so radically the standard established in Bivens and reaffirmed in Carlson, especially since the Chappell Court was presented with the issue and basically elected to ignore it.[28]

Admittedly, the legislative history of the VBA indicates that Congress has assumed some responsibility for insuring adequate compensation for service-related injuries, S.Rep. No. 94-1226, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10,

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to apply the "explicit declaration" standard in the past. For example, in Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1982), the court observed that "a Bivens action may . . . be defeated . . . when defendants show that Congress has provided an equally effective alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution." Id. at 965 (emphasis added).

[28] In a case decided the same day as Chappell, Bush v. Lucas, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), the Supreme Court was confronted with a Bivens claim brought by a federal civilian employee against his supervisor. Unlike Chappell, the Lucas Court reviewed the Bivens/Carlson test and, significantly, left the "explicit declaration" standard intact. ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2411.

reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2537, 2541. Yet nowhere in the legislative history or the statutory language of the VBA itself does the Congress "explicitly declare" that the VBA is to replace a money damages action.[29] This is particularly significant

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[29] Lucas provides an insight into the type of legislative history and statutory language that is necessary to warrant a finding that a congressionally-imposed remedial scheme is to be an exclusive remedy. The issue before the Court in Lucas was what legal remedies are available to a government civil servant who is the victim of a retaliatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised his first amendment rights. The Court posited that for a congressional remedy to be the sole source of relief, the Congress must so indicate "by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy itself. . . ." ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2411. In light of the "elaborate remedial system" enacted by Congress to handle challenges to agency personnel decisions, id. 103 S.Ct. at 2416, the Court concluded that Congress, and not the federal courts, is better equipped to prescribe the scope of relief that is made available to federal employees whose constitutional rights have been violated by their supervisors. Pursuant to the guidelines announced in Lucas, this court has reviewed the legislative history and statutory language of the VBA, and finds that neither clearly indicates that Congress intended for (cont'd)

because Congress follows the practice of expressly stating when it intends to make a legislative remedy exclusive. See 10 U.S.C.A. §1089(a) (1983); 38 U.S.C.A. §4116(a) (1979); 42 U.S.C.A. §233(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C.A. §2458a (West Supp. 1983).[30] None of the decisions which have found the VBA to be an exclusive remedy for servicemen seeking compensation for injuries sustained while in the military have reconciled their result with this congressional practice. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 464, 100 S.Ct. 647, 650, 62 L.Ed.2d

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the compensation scheme therein to be an exclusive remedy. At most, Congress intended for the VBA "to provide relief for the impaired earning capacity of veterans disabled as a result of their military service," S.Rep. No. 94-1226, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2537, 2565, leaving it to the courts to fashion a remedy that would encourage individual accountability.

[30] In each of the legislative sections cited, the Congress has declared that the remedies therein "shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter. . . ."

614 (1980) (relying on Stencel Aero Engineering Co. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977); Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983); Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1772, 76 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981); Carter v. City of Cheyenne, 649 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1981). But see supra note 21. Furthermore, cases such as Stencel, Scales, and Carter are distinguishable from the instant case becase they involved statutory actions against the Government, and not constitutional actions against federal officers.

In a statutory claim against the Government, the legislature has created the action and, appropriately enough, delineates the available remedies. The remedies are declared exclusive as the necessary tradeoff for making the sovereign liable for wrong-

doing. Thus, an injured serviceman suing the Government under the FTCA is assured a "swift, efficient remedy," and the Government itself basically remains protected from unlimited liability by the Act's limitation-of-liability provisions. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2058 (quoting Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 115, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2179, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974)).

Legislative relief is neither an exclusive nor an adequate means of compensating a person whose constitutional rights were violated by federal officers. To begin with, a Bivens action does not threaten to expose the Government to broad liability because a federal officer, and not the Government, is the party charged with wrongdoing. Additionally, the Bivens cause of action seeks to hold a federal officer accountable for his actions, supra pp. 483-484, while the statutory action

in Stencel and similar cases is designed to insure "simple, certain, and uniform compensation." Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1232 (3d Cir. 1981) (interpreting the VBA and quoting from Feres). In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the VBA is nothing more than a no-fault compensation scheme that substitutes for tort liability. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672, 97 S.Ct. at 2058; see Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 219 (D.C.Cir. 1982). In short, the VBA should be viewed as fully adequate only in combination with the Bivens remedy.

Other reasons suggest that the VBA does not pass judicial scrutiny under the Bivens/Carlson standard. Initially, even after passage of the VBA, money damages could still be recovered under state tort law for intentional and negligent torts. If the VBA was to be meant as an exclusive remedy, then why did not Congress close this legal loophole?

Furthermore, given the plethora of suits involving servicemen seeking judicial review of their intramilitary disputes,[31] why has Congress neither clarified the status of nor expressly barred money damages claims when confronted with this issue?[32]

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31 Examples include suits over atomic testing, see Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979); Gaspard v. United States, 544 F.Supp. 55 (E.D.La. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), and the Army's spraying of the herbicide Agent Orange in Vietnam, see In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F.Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Chapman v. Dow Chemical Co., 454 U.S. 1128, 102 S.Ct. 980, 71 L.Ed.2d 116 (1981). One article surveying the subject area reports that "[p]resently, there are more than one thousand pending lawsuits alleging constitutional violations." Madden, Allard, & Remes, Bedtime for Bivens: Subsituting the United States as Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 Harv.J. on Legis. 469, 473 (1983) (footnote omitted) [Hereinafter cited as Bedtime for Bivens].

32 If Congress wanted to make verterans' benefits an exclusive remedy, then it could so state in at least one annual appropriation bill that funds the VBA. Like its predecessors, the Ninety-eighth Congress (cont'd)

Even if the VBA is deemed to be an alternative remedy which Congress has explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution, this court finds that it is not "an equally effective remedial scheme." Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1468 n. 10. An alternative remedy, to be equally effective in this case, must accomplish two objectives: it must make the complainant whole and deter future such abuses of power.[33] The court remains uncertain whether the Veterans Administration's (VA) system of benefits is equipped to satisfy the plaintiff's demand for relief. Additionally, shifting the responsibility for compensating Mr. Stanley from the federal

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has taken up the question of whether sovereign immunity should bar a constitutional tort claim against military officials. And, like its predecessors, final, if any, action on the proposed bills will not occur during this session. For an account of this legislative activity, see Bedtime for Bivens, supra note 31 at 475-77.

[33] See id. at 475 & n. 19.

officers involved to the VA has little deterrent value to the individuals, and all but declares that military officers can violate the most basic of our constitutional rights with impunity.

IV

After lengthy analysis, the court concludes that the Supreme Court's decision in Chappell v. Wallace, ____ U.S. ____, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), is inapposite, and that the plaintiff has a viable Bivens-type cause of action against individual agents and officers of the United States who participated in the LSD experiments.

By way of review, the overbroad statements in Chappell must be read in the context of the facts and analysis of the opinion. A careful examination of Chappell proves that, at most, the Supreme Court has decided to bar Bivens actions brought by servicemen against their superiors if the alleged wrongdoing

occurred during active duty and was incident to the execution of military orders. Couched in these terms, the holding in the case at bar displays the proper deference to Chappell, yet preserves the sworn duty of this court to be heard when the Government's egregious behavior violates the law by victimizing the very people that it asks to defend it.

Constitutional law scholar Archibald Cox has written that for the law to have true authority and precedential value, it must "meet the needs of men and match their ethical sensibilities." A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 110 (1976). As has been demonstrated, any decision by this court strictly and literally applying the holding of Chappell to the instant case, of necessity, would crumble under the weight of legal and moral scrutiny. This court has seen few cases which more

desperately cry out for and demand judicial redress. The acts alleged to have been committed by the officers and agents named as defendants in this case are insidious to the most fundamental rights protected by our Constitution: the right of an individual to control his mind, his private thoughts, and his bodily integrity. To deny Mr. Stanley a judicial forum is to strip the court of its most important function-to ensure that the plaintiff is accorded justice under the law.

This court reiterates the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren, as quoted in the Chappell decision: "'our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.'" ____ U.S. at ____, 103 S.Ct. at 2367 (citing Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181, 188 (1962)). Accordingly, this court, having found that the special factors existing in

Chappell are not applicable to this case and that no special factors exist dictating against a Bivens-type action, refuses to conclude that the Chappell decision precludes a Bivens-type cause of action by the plaintiff Stanley.

The prior order herein denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby ratified and confirmed.

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
S.D. FLORIDA

No. 78-8141-CIV-GONZALEZ

JAMES B. STANLEY, PLAINTIFF

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Aug. 3, 1984

ORDER OF CLARIFICATION

GONZALEZ, District Judge:

THIS CAUSE has come before the Court for review sua sponte upon examination of its order entered October 28, 1983 and cited at 574 F.Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983). By this order, the Court seeks to correct two scrivener's errors in the text of the opinion. It shall be

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT:

1. At 574 F.Supp. at 483, col.1, line 8 (slip op. page 14, line 8) the word "There" be changed to "The".

2. At 574 F.Supp. at 485, col. 2, line 25 (slip op. page 18, line 16) the word "independent" be changed to "dependent".

APPENDIX G

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
UNIT B

No. 79-2571

JAMES B. STANLEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; U.S. ARMY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

March 16, 1981

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

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Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, and TUTTLE and HILL, Circuit Judges.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:

Appellant James B. Stanley appeals from the district court's granting of summary

judgment in favor of defendant. Appellant brought suit against the United States[1] under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b), §2671 et seq. to recover for injuries sustained allegedly as a result of defendant's negligent administration of a chemical warfare experimentation program in which Stanley was a participant. The district court found that Stanley's injuries arose out of activity incident to military service and held, therefore, that the claim was barred by the Feres doctrine.

Three issues are raised on this appeal. The first is whether the district court correctly found that Stanley's claims were for injuries incurred while engaging in

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[1]Plaintiff's original complaint, filed May 8, 1978, named as defendants the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Department of Defense and the U.S. Army. Subsequently, plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to name the United States Government as a party defendant was granted.

activity incident to service and thus within the ambit of the Feres doctrine. The second issue is whether Stanley alleged a cause of action based on injuries sustained subsequent to his discharge. Finally, we must decide whether the district court properly ordered the entry of summary judgment rather than dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We find that the trial court correctly applied Feres and held the United States immune to all of Stanley's claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, since all of his injuries arose while he was engaged in activity incident to his military service. However, we reverse the granting of summary judgment, as we find that, once having found the Feres doctrine applicable, the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTS

In February, 1958, appellant was a Master Sergeant in the United States Army, stationed with his wife and children at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Responding to a posted notice, appellant volunteered to participate in an Army program allegedly intended to aid the Army in developing and testing methods of defense against chemical warfare.[2] He was assigned to the Army base at Edgewood

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[2]The statutory basis for the program was the Organization of the Army Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 322, 5 U.S.C. §235a) which authorized the Secretary to conduct research and development programs related to activities of the Army. On February 26, 1953, the Secretary of Defense promulgated a memorandum to the service secretaries setting forth policy concerning use of volunteers in research. On November 3, 1955, the Secretary of the Army issued General Order No. 64 authorizing and directing the Director of Research and Development to act for the Secretary in matters of research and development. On May 17, 1956, the Director of Research and Development approved a program for the use of volunteers in psychochemical research, including defense against the chemical warfare use of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide.

Arsenal, Aberdeen, Maryland. There, during the course of clinical testing, he was given Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (commonly known as LSD) without his knowledge.

Appellant claims that the defendants were negligent in several respects in their administration of the program.[3] Primarily, appellant points to their alleged negligence in their administration of LSD to human subjects, their failure to obtain his informed consent to participate in the

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[3]The complaint specifically alleged negligence in the following respects: (1) Defendants knew or should have known that LSD is a consciousness and behavior altering drug capable of producing irreparably harmful results, including death, and that the drug would affect different persons in different, unpredictable ways; (2) Defendants breached their duty to warn Plaintiff; (3) Defendants failed to take adequate precautions; (4) Defendants negligently failed to debrief Plaintiff after administering the drug to advise of the potentially hazardous physiological and psychological effects; (5) Defendants negligently failed to continue to monitor the Plaintiff following the experiment; (6) Defendants negligently failed to obtain Plaintiff's informed consent.

experiment, an their failure to debrief and monitor him after the test. Appellant claims that he suffered, as a result of this negligence, severe physical and mental injuries which cause him continual problems in the performance of his military duties and ultimately disrupted his marriage.

After completing the testing, appellant returned to his regular duties and continued his career in the Army for eleven years. He retired honorably as a Sergeant First Class in 1969. In 1975, when he received a letter from the Department of the Army, Walter Reed Medical Center, soliciting his participation in a follow-up study of volunteers who participated in the 1958 experiments at Edgewood Arsenal, appellant learned for the first time that he had been given LSD during the course of the 1958 experimentation.

Appellant filed claims with the United States Army and the Central Intelligence

Agency[4] which were denied.[5] Thereafter, Stanley filed this suit in the district court for the Southern District of Florida.

II. APPLICABILITY OF FERES

In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), the Supreme Court considered the claims of three servicement for recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained while they were on active duty. The Court was

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[4]The CIA found that its records disclosed no evidence that they had participated in the experiments. The Army office of the Judge Advocate General also found nothing in their records which indicated CIA involvement.

[5]On November 16, 1977, Stanley received a letter from the U.S. Army Claims Service informing him that his claims under the FTCA were not payable since "injuries to individuals incurred while on duty with the United States Army are considered to be incident to the individual's service, Feres v. United States." The letter further advised him that he could file suit in the appropriate United States District Court if he was dissatisfied with the action taken on his claim.

persuaded to dismiss the suits by consideration of factors such as the "peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superior, the effect of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty." United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112, 75 S.Ct. 141, 143, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954).[6] The Court held that "the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to

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[6]Other factors considered by the Court in Feres include the notion that Congress could not have intended to include military personnel within the FTCA coverage, given the statutory compensation system for members of the armed service; the fact that plaintiffs could not point to any liability of a private individual analogous to that which they were asserting against the United States; and the concern that application of local tort law under the FTCA would interfere with the uniform conduct of military activities by imposing standards of care that varied from state to state.

servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159.

Although the Feres doctrine has been questioned at times,[7] its viability was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed. 2d 66 (1976). Therefore, if Stanley was engaged in activities incident to his military service at the time his injuries arose, the district court was correct in holding the United States immune to Stanley's suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Appellant argues that his participation in the chemical warfare testing program should not be considered "activity incident

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[7]See discussion in Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1980); Note , From Feres to Stancel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery? 77 Mich.L.Rev. 1099 (1979).

to service" because he was a volunteer and had been given a release from his regular duties in order to participate in the program. Additionally, appellant contends that the Government's activity here was illegal and thus should not be covered by the Feres doctrine.

Appellant has no sound authority for his assertion that the voluntary status of his participation in the program necessitates the conclusion that Feres should not control. Feres has been applied in cases involving a wide range of voluntary activity. See, e.g., Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1980) (servicemen killed while voluntarily participating in a Navy Seal Training exercise); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (servicemen killed while voluntarily traveling as a military space available passenger); Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (per

curiam) (motor vehicle accident on base while serviceman tending to personal business); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (serviceman injuried while riding horse rented from stable owned and operated by Marine Corps); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966) (serviceman injuried in swimming pool at an Air Force base); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980) (serviceman injuried while participating voluntarily in Naval experiment designed to test the effectiveness of certain protective clothing when exposed to sulphur mustard gas); Schmid v. Rumsfield, 481 F.Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (serviceman assaulted as result of his voluntary activities as informant assisting in the recovery of stolen government property and prosecution of drug offenses); Loeh v. United States, No. 77-2065-B and 77-2023-B (S.D.Ill. April 23, 1979) (serviceman injured

when administered LSD while participating in Army drug experimentation program).

Additionally, courts have consistently applied Feres in suits to recover for the alleged medical malpractice of Army physicians and surgeons where the claimant's activity when injured was essentially voluntary in nature. See, e.g., Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1980); Vallance v. United States, 574 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 965, 99 S.Ct. 453, 58 L.Ed.2d 423 (1978); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S.Ct. 50, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973); Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1971); Howell v. United States, et al., 489 F.Supp. 147 (W.D.Tenn.1980). Feres has even been applied in cases involving elective surgery. Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963, 95

S.Ct. 1354, 43 L.Ed.2d 441 (1974); Lowe v. United States, 440 F.2d (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833, 92 S.Ct. 83, 30 L.Ed.2d 64 (1971). Moreover, the servicemen in the three cases before the Supreme Court in Feres itself were all engaged in essentially voluntary activity at the time they were injured. Therefore, appellant's contention that the voluntary nature of his participation in the program should take him outside the bounds of Feres is without merit.

Likewise, the fact that appellant had been given a release from his regular duties does not preclude the possibility that appellant was injured whie engaging in "activity incident to service." In a factual setting virtually identical to the one at hand, the Second Circuit found that the serviceman was on active duty at the time the experimentation took place despite the fact that the plaintiff was on a "Temporary Duty Assign-

ment" when he was administered LSD. See Lerner v. United States, et al., No. 76 Civ. 4349 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1978), aff'd mem, 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir., 1978). Similarly, in Mason v. United States, supra, this Court was not persuaded by the argument that Feres should not apply when a serviceman was injured during the time in which he had been given a release from his routine duties. The court reasoned that the serviceman was still subject to all military regulations and was available for emergency service or temporary duties and held the government immune to suit. 568 F.2d at 1136. See also Stansberry v. Middendorf, 567 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Thomason v. Sanchez, 398 F.Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976) (Feres applied where serviceman injured while riding motorcycle on base during "off-duty" hours); Watkins v. United States, 462 F.Supp. 980 (S.D. Ga.

1977) (serviceman injured on base during "off duty" hours).

Appellant relies upon several cases in which military plaintiffs were allowed to recover despite the government's argument that Feres should apply. Those cases, however, all involved situations which are distinguishable from the situations at hand. For example, in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954), the Supreme Court allowed a veteran to pursue his claim under the FTCA since he had actually been discharged at the time he was injured. See also Bankston v. United States, 480 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1973). In contrast, Stanley does not claim to have been discharged at the time he participated in the experiments. Stanley also fails to allege that he was on furlough or on a pass as were the plaintiffs in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed.

1200 (1949) and Knecht v. United States, 144 F.Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd 242 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1957). Finally Stanley was not tending to his personal affairs as he saw fit at the time of the accident as were the plaintiffs in Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980) and Hand v. United States, 260 F.Supp. 38 (M.D. Ga. 1966). See also Downes v. United States, 249 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965).[8]

The fact that the injury occurred on a military base in strong evidence that the plaintiff was engaged in activity incident to service at the time, although this fact alone is not dispositive. See Hand v. United States, supra; Downes v. United States,

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[8]Moreover, the fact that a serviceman was tending to personal affairs at the time of his injury has not always led a court to find the situation outside the bounds of Feres. See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1978); Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1954).

supra. The Court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the injury and distinguish between "those cases involving activities arising from life on the military reservation and those in which the presence on the base has little to do with the soldier's military service." Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980).

In the Parker case, this Court held that a serviceman's claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act was not foreclosed even though the injury occurred on a military base where the function the plaintiff was performing at the time of his death was not related to his military status and did not arise from his life on the base. The court allowed Parker to maintain his suit under the Act since he was on a four day pass and merely driving through the base while tending to the purely personal business of moving his family to a new home at the time the accident occurred.[9]

In contrast, Stanley was not on a pass and was not tending to purely personal business at the time this alleged injury arose. At the time Stanley was given LSD, he was a Master Sergeant in the Army who had volunteered to participate in an experimental program in lieu of his regular duties. The experiment was conducted on an Army base by and for the benefit of the Army. Thus, the relationship between Stanley and the allegedly negligent individuals stemmed from their official military relationship. See Lee v. United States, 261 F.Supp. 252, 256 (C.D.C. Cal. 1966), rev'd 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053, 89 S.Ct. 691, 21 L.Ed.2d 695 (1969). See also, Camassar v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 894

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[9]The Parker court indicated that Feres might have applied had Parker been attending to personal affairs arising from life on the base, such as participating in recreational activities or shopping.

(D.Conn. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 531 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1976) [sic]. Stanley had been informed that he was free to leave the testing program at any time; however, this freedom appears to have been restricted to his returning to his original post at Fort Knox. He did return to his original duties there after he was released from Edgewood and remained in the service for eleven years. At least, therefore, he was subject to ultimate military control throughout the duration of his participation in the program. See Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); cf. Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1971) (rejecting contention that Feres applies only where military discipline is involved.) Stanley was receiving military pay and was promised a letter of commendation for his participation in the program. Clearly his participation in the program was activity incident to his

military service despite the fact that he had been given a release from his regular duties. See Garrett v. United States, 625 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1980); Shults v. United States, 421 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).

The trial court also correctly disposed of appellant's contention that the testing program was so "patently illegal" that it could not be considered activity incident to service. The cases cited by appellant in support of this contention are inapposite as they do not involve tort claims by servicemen or address the applicability of the Feres doctrine. See Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F.Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Avery v. United States, 434 F.Supp. 937 (D.Conn. 1977); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977). Moreover, the argument that a drug testing program such as the one involved in this case should be considered outside the scope of the Feres doctrine since

the program was not the kind of activity which might reasonably be anticipated as ancillary to military service has been rejected in two other cases involving facts virtually identical to those before this Court. Lerner v. United States, supra; Loeh v. United States, supra; Nagy v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979). See also Southard v. United States, 397 F.Supp. 409 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Feres applied despite allegation of illegal conduct by the Army).

The Feres doctrine has been applied broadly over the years. Although the action before the Court in Feres was against the United States, the doctrine has been extended to apply to suits against individual defendants. See, e.g., Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1967); Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948, 86 S.Ct. 1205, 16 L.Ed.2d 210 (1966). Likewise, although the

Feres case involved allegations of negligence, the doctrine has been extended to hold the United States immune to suits based on intentional or reckless as well as constitutional torts. See, e.g., Jaffe[e] v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 632, 635 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066; Citizen National Bank of Waukegan v. United States, 594 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1978); Calhoun v. United States, 475 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.Cal. 1977), aff'd, 604 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980); Misko v. United States, 453 F.Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F.Supp. 46 (D.Conn. 1971), aff'd 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972); Everett v. United States, 492 F.Supp. 318, 322 (S.D. Ohio E.D., 1980), Schnurman v. United States, supra; Sigler v. LeVan, 485

F.Supp. 185, 191 (D.Md. 1980); Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F.Supp. 19, 21 (N.D.Cal. 1979); Nagy v. United States, supra; Thornwell v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 344, 348 (D.D.C. 1979); Lange v. Black, No. 78-518-E (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1979). But see Jaffee v. United States No. 79-1543 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1980) (petition for rehearing en banc granted, April 11, 1980); James v. United States, 358 F.Supp. 1381 (D.R.I. 1973). These extensions of the Feres doctrine have been premised on the notion that the same policies underlying the Feres doctrine are involved regardless of whether the suit is against the United States or the specific individuals responsible and whether or not the legal theory of a complaint is negligence. Despite the apparent harshness of the application of Feres to the facts before us, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court correctly applied Feres and held the United Staes immune to Stanley's

suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries allegedly sustained due to negligence in the administration of the drug testing program at Edgewood Arsenal.

III. SEPARATE TORT THEORY

As an additional point on appeal, appellant contends that even if Feres precludes his recovery of damages based on the original experiments, he has properly alleged a separate cause of action for damages due to the negligent failure of the Army officers involved to monitor his condition after his discharge which would not be barred by Feres. For this contention, he relies principally on a case involving similar facts, Thornwell v. United States, supra, where the court allowed recovery for damages resulting from the government's failure to provide a veteran with follow-up treatment after his discharge. 471 F.Supp. at 349-53.[10]

Appellees argue that appellant's reliance upon the Thornwell case constitutes a new theory which appellant should not be entitled to raise for the first time in a reply brief to this appellate court. See Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976); Capps v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 536 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1976); Stanley Educational Methods, Inc. v. Becker C.P.A. Review Course, Inc., 539 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976). We need not decide the correctness of appellee's argument on this point because we find that, in any case, Stanley has failed to allege facts which bring his case within the separate tort theory of the Thornwell case.

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[10]The Thornwell court found that the plaintiff there could recover both for acts of negligence and violations of his Fifth Amendment rights which occurred after his discharge.

In Thornwell, the district court considered claims of a serviceman who had been surreptitiously drugged with LSD and then subjected to intense interrogation after he had been imprisoned as part of an Army investigation into the theft of a large number of classified documents. During his imprisonment, Thornwell had been subjected to several different, harsh interrogation techniques; the use of LSD was part of the investigation as well as part of an Army program to test the utility of LSD as an aid to interrogation. The court applied the Feres doctrine and dismissed those of Thornwell's claims which were based on injuries sustained due to the administration of LSD to him while he was in the service; however, the court found that Feres did not preclude Thornwell from pursuing claims based on injuries due to conduct occurring after his discharge. The court concluded that

Feres should not apply to the post-discharge claims because Thornwell had been injured by two entirely separate torts- an intentional act while he was on active duty and a subsequent negligent act which "occurred, in its entirety, after he attained civilian status." 471 F.Supp. at 351 (emphasis in original). The court found that this result was compelled by United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954), where the Court ruled that Feres should not prevent a veteran from recovering for service-related injuries which were aggravated by an operation performed negligently six years after his discharge from the service. Additionally, the court found that Thornwell's situation was analogous to that of the plaintiff in Schwartz v. United States, 230 F.Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964). There the court allowed recovery for injuries resulting from the negligent failure of the

government to provide proper follow-up care to a veteran who had been treated with a radioactive contrast dye, umbrathor, when he had experienced sinus trouble while he was an enlisted man in the Navy. See also Hungerford v. United States, 192 F.Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).

Initially, we find that Stanley has failed to allege an intentional tort committed while he was in the service. Although there is some language in the Thornwell case which would indicate that a negligent act will in some circumstances suffice as the original tort,[11] at least one court following Thornwell emphasized the fact that the plaintiff there, like the plaintiff in Thornwell, had undergone a wilfully inflicted tort while on active duty. Everett

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[11]See 471 F.Supp. at 352.

v. United States, supra at 326 n.6. See also Schnurman v. United States, supra at 429. Thus the clearest way to fall within the theory of Thornwell would be to allege an intentional or wilful tort injuring an active duty seviceman and a negligent or intentioanl failure to provide proper follow-up care which begins after the plaintiff's discharge from the service.

Even if Stanley's allegations of negligence suffice as the original tort, however, he has failed to allege a separate negligent act occurring "entirely after discharge." The plaintiff in Schwartz v. United States, supra, unlike the plaintiff here, based no claim on negligence occurring during the time he was in the service. His sole contention was that he had been injured by a series of negligently performed medical tests during the twelve year period after his discharge, which resulted in his injuries.

There was no such active negligence alleged to have occurred after Stanley's discharge. Stanley has alleged merely an act of negligence which occurred while he was on active duty, the effects of which remained uncorrected after discharge. See Nagy, supra.

Moreover, even if the Thornwell court is correct in its conclusion that a mere failure to provide information is a separate actionable tort, we are not persuaded that the negligent failure to warn in Stanley's case occurred "entirely after his discharge." Thornwell received a general discharge just four months after he was given LSD. Thus, the government's failure to monitor his condition took place entirely after his discharge. Stanley, on the other hand, remained in the service for eleven years after the administration of the drug. Even if the government was negligent in failing to monitor his condition and provide him with

any treatment, this negligent failure to monitor him cannot be seen as having taken place "entirely after his discharge." Stanley has at best alleged two negligent acts, the administration of the LSD and the negligent failure to monitor his condition, both of which occurred at least in part during his time as a serviceman even if they or their effects lingered after his discharge. Allegations of such "continuing torts" do not excape the application of the Feres doctrine.

In the Feres case, one of the claimants alleged that a towel had been left in his stomach during an operation while he was in the service. The towel was discovered during an operation taking place after his discharge yet the court dismissed the complaint since the original injury had occurred while he was in the service. In several other analogous cases, the courts characterized the situa-

tions as simple acts of negligence which remained uncorrected after discharge and denied recovery despite allegations of a failure to provide follow-up care. See Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 676, 30 L.Ed.2d 664 (1972) (failure to inform veteran of true content of X-rays which had been taken while he was on active duty); Schnurman v. United States, supra, (failure to provide veteran with follow-up care and supervision for injuries resulting from his exposure to mustard gas while he was a serviceman participating in an experiment to test protective clothing); Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F.Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (veteran's claim based on a failure to provde him either before or after his discharge with results of a blood test taken while he was in the service). Moreover, in the Thornwell case itself the court stated:

> Whatever the broader complications of [Henning and Wisniewski], it is clear at the very least that a mere act of negligence which takes place while the plaintiff is on active duty and which then remains uncorrected after discharge is not grounds for suit. 471 F.Supp. at 351.

We find that Stanley likewise has failed to allege a negligent act occurring entirely after his discharge necessary to fall within the separate tort theory of Thornwell.

In reaching this conclusion we are persuaded by the reasoning of the court in Schnurman v. United States, supra. In that case a serviceman who had volunteered in 1944 to participate in an experiment designed to test the effectiveness of protective clothing against exposure to sulphur mustard gas was injured when his gas mask malfunctioned. Two years later he was discharged from the service. For thirteen years after his discharge he sought medical help for chest pains, respiratory problems and other ailments but never mentioned the possibility

that those injuries were the result of the mustard gas exposure. In 1976 the claimant notified a doctor that he had once been exposed to sulphur mustard gas and the doctor concluded that the plaintiff's medical problems resulted from this exposure. The plaintiff then filed suit, alleging that he had been injured by the government's negligent failure to provide him after his discharge with follow-up examinations, treatment, supervision or to warn him of the risk of physical injury presented by his exposure to mustard gas. The court found that: "The Department of the Navy could well have been more attentive to plaintiff's immediate reactions to the mustard exposure and perhaps should have ensured that the subjects were fully informed of the true nature of the experiment once the need for secrecy had passed." 490 F.Supp. at 437. Nevertheless, the court rejected plaintiff's

argument based on Thornwell. In so doing the court stated:

> Without commenting on the compatibility of [the holdings in United States v. Brown, Schwartz v. United States and Thornwell] with the Feres doctrine, the Court concludes that application of this continuing or separate tort theory to plaintiff's case would be inconsistent both with the instant facts and with the language and rationale of Feres. Plaintiff's brain, cardiovascular, hearing, respiratory, and eyesight difficulties for which he seeks compensation were not shown to be caused in any way by the government's failure to treat plaintiff after discharge or to warn him of the true nature of the gas to which he had been exposed. There was no testimony that his injuries were in any way aggravated or multiplied by this alleged negligence on the part of the government, nor was it shown that follow-up treatment could have avoided any long-term effects of the exposure, as was the case in United States v. Brown, supra. Indeed, simply stated, there was no evidence to support a conclusion that there was any causal connection between the plaintiff's present condition and the government's alleged failure in regard to the issue now addressed. The Feres doctrine, in the Court's view, is one of broad application. Disallowing recovery for an in-service tort under Feres, but allowing recovery for a failure to monitor and treat injuries resulting from that same tort would leave very little of Feres immunity, especially in cases where injuries do not manifest themselves until

after a serviceman's discharge. See Broudy v. United States, Civ. No. 79-02626LEW(GX) (C.D. Cal., Jan. 2, 1980).

Id. Similarly, we conclude that the facts and rationale of the Feres doctrine demand its application in this case.

IV. GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellant contends that even if the trial court was correct in finding that Feres applied to the facts of this case, the court erred in disposing of the case by way of summary judgment rather than dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This contention is based on the notion that if Feres applies, a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Feres doctrine is a judicially created exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act and when the government has not consented to suit, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. Appellant argues that once a

court has determined that Feres applies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and, therefore, has no power to render a judgment on the merits of the case. Thus, he contends that the trial court in this case had no power to grant summary judgment, which acts as a final adjudication on the merits, but should have dismissed the case without prejudice. See Dassinger v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 505 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1974); State of Oregon v. United States, 195 F.Supp. 276 (D.Ore. 1961), aff'd 308 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941, 83 S.Ct. 934, 9 L.Ed.2d 967 (1963); People v. United States, 307 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1962). See generally, 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶56.03, ¶56.26.

Appellant points also to cases holding that summary judgment is an extreme remedy which is proper only if the claimant is not entitled to recovery under any circumstance.

See, e.g., Weber v. Towner County, 565 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1977); Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405 (D.C.N.Y. 1973). He contends that he has a separate theory of recovery based on the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. §1331. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).[12] Appellant, therefore, asks this Court to reverse the granting of summary judgment and to remand with directions that the claim be

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[12] At the time plaintiff filed his complaint in this case, the Fifth Circuit took a restrictive approach to causes of action under Bivens. See Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Seibert v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1979). However, subsequent to the trial court's granting of summary judgment in this case, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Davis was reversed by the Supreme Court. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). This Court has applied Davis retroactively, Seibert v. Baptist, 599 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979).

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiff be allowed to amend "to correct a defective allegation of jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. §1653.

"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . ., and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1352, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980), quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). Accord, Enfinger v. Enfinger, 452 F.Supp. 553 (M.D.Ga. 1978). Where no such consent exists, a district court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the United States. Mitchell, supra, 445 U.S. at 538, 100 S.Ct. 1352. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495,

60 S.Ct. 659, 84 L.Ed. 888 (1940); Sprouse v. Federal Prison Industries, Inc., 480 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1973).

The Federal Tort Claims Act is a waiver of the federal government's immunity for the torts of its employees under certain circumstances. The Act provides that the United States shall be liable for "injury or . . . death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employer [sic] of the Government . . . under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant. . . ." 28 U.S.C. §1346(b). This waiver has been construed broadly. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 71 S.Ct. 63, 95 L.Ed. 595 (1951). However, this consent to suit is not without exceptions. The Act itself excludes certain types of government action from judicial review. 28 U.S.C. §2680. More importantly, in Feres v. United States, the

Supreme Court held that the Act did not waive immunity for claims brought by servicemen for injuries sustained while on active duty. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31, n.25, 73 S.Ct. 956, 965, 97 L.Ed. 1427 n.25 (1953). Courts have uniformly held that were conduct complained of falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the FTCA, the district court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof. See, e.g., First National Bank v. United States, 552 F.2d 370, 374 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835, 98 S.Ct. 122, 54 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977); Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 876 (10th Cir. 1976); Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1392 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972); Konecny v. United States, 388 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1967); Sanchez Tapia v. United States, 388 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1964); Summers v. United States, 480 F.Supp. 347, 349 (D.Md. 1979). We conclude that when a case under

the Tort Claims Acts falls within the bounds of Feres, ajudically created exception to the Act, the Court likewise has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

A federal district court is under a mandatory duty to dismis a suit over which it has no jurisdiction. Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc. of Plano, 584 F.2d 668, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1978); Rodriquez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1192 n.30 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Scott v. Abilene Independent School District, 438 F.Supp. 594, 598 (N.D.Ga. 1977). When a court must dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction, the court should not adjudicate the merits of the claim. Durham v. Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1968); Guthrie v. Dow Chemical Co., 445 F.Supp. 311, 315 (S.D. Tex. 1978). Since the granting of summary judgment is a disposition on the merits of the case, a motion for summary judgment is not the appropriate

procedure for raising the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Studio Electrical Technicians, Local 728 v. International Photographers of the Motion Picture Industries, Local 659, 598 F.2d 551, 552 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979); O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 n.3 & 4 (9th Cir. 1977); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975); Kowalezwk v. Walsh, 482 F.Supp. 959, 962 (D. Mass. 1979); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F.Supp. 445 (D.Colo. 1978); Parker Drilling Company v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F.Supp. 1127, 1130 n.1 (D.Alaska 1978). See also, Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally, 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §2713, p. 402 et seq. Therefore, since a defense based on the Feres doctrine is premised on the notion that there is no jurisdiction to hear the claim as the United

States has not waived sovereign immunity for that kind of suit, such defenses should be raised by a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than by a motion for summary judgment. See Donham v. United States, 395 F.Supp. 52, 53 (E.D. Mo. E.D. 1975), Aff'd, 536 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nom., Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1976); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶56.17[65] at 56-1091, ¶56.26[1] at 1513-14. See also, Mitchell v. Riddell, 402 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 456, 89 S.Ct. 1223, 22 L.Ed.2d 415 (1969); Jorrie v. Imperial Investment Company, 355 F.Supp. 1088 (W.D. Tex. 1973). Accordingly, we conclude that the court below erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States and should have dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The government's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Appellees correctly state the rule[13] that a district court must treat a 12(b) (6) motion for failure to state a claim as a motion for summary judgment where the trial court considers matters outside the pleadings. See United Independent School District v. City of Laredo, 634 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980) (Unpublished); Save Our Cemeteries, Inc., v. Archdiocese of New Orleans, Inc., 568 F.2d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836, 99 S.Ct. 120, 58 L.Ed.2d 133 (1978).

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[13] Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b) provides in pertinent part:

> If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

However, a 12(b)(1) motion for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not so converted. Mortensen v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977); Rosemound Sand and Gravel Company v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Company, 469 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Titus, 190 F.2d 653, 655 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Air Line Pilots Association v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 444 F.Supp. 1138, 1142 (D.D.C. 1978). See also, Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1010, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947). A dismissal for failure to state a claim is a disposition on the merits. Kuhn v. National Association of Letter Carriers, Branch 5, 570 F.2d 757, 760 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978). Since appellant's allegations should not have survived the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack based on Feres, the court had no jurisdiction to dispose of the case on the merits by reaching

the 12(b)(6) motion of dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 1980). Therefore, the fact that the trial court in this case considered matters outside the pleadings fails to render his action in treating the Feres issue on a motion for summary judgment proper. See O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., supra.

The government also relies on several cases where the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment since subject matter jurisdiction was found lacking. See, e.g., Sherwood Medical Industries v. Deknotel, 512 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975); McDaniel v. Travelers Insurance Co., 494 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). These cases, however, are not binding authority for the government's assertion that we should affirm the granting of summary judgment in this case. In the Sherwood case, the Eight

Circuit affirmed the granting of summary judgment because the court found there was no "actual controversy" as is required for a suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Summary judgment there was appropriate as the Declaratory Judgment Act does not of itself create jurisdiction so the court must have had another basis of jurisdiction in order to have reached the question of whether relief was available under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Jones v. Alexander, 609 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1980); Wells v. United States, 280 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1970). The McDaniel case was a suit brought within the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court. There, we affirmed per curiam the granting of summary judgment because the plaintiff had failed in his attempt to allege that a maritime contract existed or that defendants had breached it. The question of whether the trial court should have dismissed the case

for lack of jurisdiction rather than granting summary judgment was not raised.

There are cases where courts have disposed of the Feres issue by way of summary judgment. See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Avila v. United States, No. EP-80-LA-22 (W.D. Tex., July 24, 1980); Butterline v. United States, No. 77-3034 (E.D.Pa. January 8, 1980). However, we have found no case which addresses the precise issue before this Court, or provides any reasoned explanation for why summary judgment can be an appropriate disposition of a case in which Feres applies.[14] There are numerous cases where the courts have granted motions to dismiss

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[14] So far as appears, the parties in none of the cases cited by defendants raised this issue. Certainly, it was not reached in either of the per curiam opinions by this Court cited by defendant. See Mason v. United States, supra; McDaniel v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra.

based on the Feres doctrine. See, e.g., Charland v. United States, supra; Daly v. United States, No. 76-2381-A (N.D. Mass. 1980); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F.Supp. 187 (D.Md. 1980). Lerner, supra; Nagy, supra; Thornwell, supra. Moreover, in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977), the Supreme Court found that the district court had properly dismissed the plaintiff's FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Feres applied.

The Supreme Court appears to consider the Feres doctrine to be an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA. See, id, at 674, 97 S.Ct. at 2079 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dalehite v. United States, supra, 396 U.S. at 31 N. 25, 73 S.Ct. at 965 n.25. We conclude, therefore, that the only correct disposition of a case based on Feres is dismissal for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction since the United States has not consented to the kinds of suits in which Feres applies.[15]

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[15] Possibly the confusion over this issue has been caused by language in Feres. There the court stated:

> Looking to the detail of the Act, it is true that it provides broadly, that the District Court, "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages. . . ." This confers jurisdiction to render judgment upon all such claims. But it does not say that all claims must be allowed. Jurisdiction is necessary to deny a claim on its merits as a matter of law as much as to adjudge that liability exists. We interpret this language to mean all its says, but no more. Jurisdiction of the defendant now exists where the defendant was immune from suit before; it remains for courts, in exercise of their jurisdiction, to determine whether any claim is recognizable in law.

340 F.2d 141. The Supreme Court then dismissed the cases for failure to state a claim. However, subsequent cases have shown that the Supreme Court appears to consider the Feres doctrine as an exception to the FTCA's limited wavier of immunity. Perhaps the difficulty stems from the fact that before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Feres, no exception to the Tort Claims Act for activities incident to service (cont'd)

Finally appellees argue that it would be improper for this court to remand this case with leave to amend since any amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed. 2d 222 (1962). They contend that Feres would bar even a constitutional claim which might be raised by appellants in this case. While we do not express any opinion on the merits of appellant's possible amended claims, we find that Stanley has at least a colorable constitutional claim based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 69 (1971). See Jaffee v. United States, No. 79-1543 (February 20, 1980) (petition for rehearing en banc granted, April 11, 1980);

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existed, and the court correctly had jurisdiction under the Act in the Feres case itself to decide the cases before them on a motion to dismis for failure to state a claim. We do not find that this language in Feres rquires us to affirm the granting of summary judgment in this case.

James v. United States, 358 F.Supp. 1381 (D.R.I. 1973).

A court must dismiss a case over which it has no jurisdiction whenever the fatal defect appears. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 391 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc. of Plano, 584 F.2d 668, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1978).[16] Leave to amend defective allegations of subject matter jurisdiction should be freely given. Eklund v. Mora, 410 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1969). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).

While we approve the determinaton of the trial court that the plaintiff could not prevail on his complaint, we reverse the

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[16] See also Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) which provides:

> "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."

order granting summary judgment and remand for the consideration of the trial court of any amendment which the appellant may offer, seeking to cure the jurisdictional defect.

VACATED and REMANDED.

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
NOV 12 1986
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK

Nos. 86-393 and 86-443

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

JAMES B. STANLEY,
Respondent,

-and-

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, et al.,
Petitioners,

vs.

JAMES B. STANLEY,
Respondent.

ON PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In framing the questions presented for review, the United States and the other Federal Petitioners in Case No. 86-393 include matters which are in dispute. For example, it is in dispute whether Plaintiff was on "active duty" status while participating in an "official Army drug experimentation program," and it is in dispute that an appealable partial final judgment was ever entered in favor of the United States. It is also disputed that Plaintiff is suing his "superior officers." Concerning the question framed by the State Petitioners in Case No. 86-443, there is nothing in the record to substantiate that the "state civilian employees at all times acted under federal military direction and control." We therefore feel constrained to restate the questions presented as follows:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reopening the law of the case as established in a previous appeal, when controlling authority had changed during the interim.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by finding this Court's decision in *Chappell v. Wallace,* and its rationale, to be distinguishable from the unique facts alleged in the present case.

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Nos. 86-393 and 86-443

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ON PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The Respondent, James B. Stanley, respectfully requests that this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case. That opinion is reported at 786 F.2d 1490 and republished at (1a-20a).[1]

1. All references herein (eg. 1a-20a), are directed to the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari filed by the United States of America, Case No. 86-393.

STATEMENT

There are some incorrect assertions in the statements of both Petitioners, as well as some statements outside the record. Also, some important facts which make this case more unique (and less "certworthy") have been omitted from the Petitioners' statements. We therefore supplement the statements as follows.

The Eleventh Circuit below mentioned some of the important facts in its opinion. (2a-3a). The district court judge elaborated further in his most recent opinion. (22a-23a).

The plaintiff did not volunteer to participate in any drug testing. He was not a true "volunteer," nor was he under any orders, nor was he taking advantage of a military privilege, nor was he on his regular duty status at the time in question.

While he was a master sergeant in the U.S. Army, Plaintiff volunteered to participate in a program ostensibly for the testing and development of various gas masks and protective clothing to be used as a defense against chemical warfare attack. There was no compulsion but he was promised that letters of commendation would be put in his file and he was released from his regular duty status for approximately a month. At any time Plaintiff desired he could withdraw from the program and return to his regular duties. There is no evidence as to his technical duty status during that month.

Plaintiff was deliberately given false information about the program in order to extract his consent to volunteer. The real purpose of the program was to observe Plaintiff's "unwitting reaction" to LSD, which was secretly introduced into his bloodstream on four occasions by being mixed

with his drinking water, while he carried out the charade of testing gas masks and clothing. Defendants intentionally withheld the true facts for the next eighteen years since it was an integral part of the program to have unwitting human subjects for experimental drug testing.

When Plaintiff unknowingly ingested this dangerous drug on four occasions in February 1958, he experienced severe reactions including hallucinations, but had no idea what was happening. Hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD were virtually unknown to the public in 1958. Eventually Plaintiff returned to his active duty at Fort Knox, Kentucky, but he continued to have recurrent episodes. He periodically lapsed into periods of incoherency, sometimes marked by violence, and he had no recall of such events afterwards. On one occasion he awoke from sleep late at night and, without reason, violently beat his wife and children later being unable to recall the event.

Plaintiff's inexplicable behavorial changes eventually resulted in the breakdown and dissolution of his marriage and family life. (22a-23a, n. 2). He was thereafter unable to perform his military duties efficiently and was reduced in rank for inefficiency. At times he would be absent without leave and could not recall his whereabouts when questioned. Before the drug testing he had an unblemished record; he had earned various military honors and intended to pursue a promising military career.

In 1969, Plaintiff retired from the army. He did not bring an FTCA action in 1975 as Petitioner (the United States) indicates. In December of 1975, he received a letter from the Department of the Army, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which disclosed for the first time that he had been given LSD during February, 1958. The letter solicited his participation in a follow-up study of

the "volunteers" who participated in the 1958 LSD experiments. Plaintiff filed administrative claims with the United States Army, which were denied with the statement that there was no appropriation available to pay such a claim and that if Plaintiff was dissatisfied he should file an action in federal district court. (70a, n. 5). Plaintiff thereafter filed this action in the district court in May, 1978. (3a).

In the first appeal to the fifth circuit, the fifth circuit did not affirm an order dismissing the FTCA claims, as Petitioner states. Rather, the fifth circuit vacated a summary judgment on grounds that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter any judgment in favor of the government and, at most, it could only dismiss the FTCA claim, without prejudice, if the government was immune from suit. (67a-95a).

Next the Petitioner states that, after remand from the first appeal, the district court entered a partial final judgment in favor of the United States on November 9, 1982, which was never appealed. That is not exactly what happened. The district court entered an interlocutory "order" directing the clerk to enter a partial final judgment in favor of the United States (54a-55a), however the clerk never entered any final judgment on the civil docket. (See Appendix "A" to this brief). There was therefore no final judgment from which to appeal, as discussed in more detail *infra*.

Finally, the eleventh circuit below, in the second appeal, held that a case-by-case analysis is required under *Chappell*[2] to determine whether a particular *Bivens*[3] suit

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2. *Chappell v. Wallace*, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).

3. *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

would undermine military discipline *if* the facts of the case appear to fall outside the typical *Feres*[4] factual paradigm. The government's Petition for Certiorari, at pages 6 and 11, omits the last half of this statement. (As the eleventh circuit also stated in *Cole v. United States,* 755 F.2d 873, 877, n. 11 (11th Cir. 1985), "We do not imply that such a case-by-case analysis is required in all cases.")

Also, in this regard, both the United States and the state defendants repeatedly assert in their Petitions that Plaintiff is suing his "superior officers" for constitutional violations, which is prohibited by the *Chappell* decision. We dispute that. We believe the evidence in this case, if we are allowed to present it, will indicate that the various different individual defendants, some of whom are civilian personnel, some are doctors, others are non-military federal executive officers, a university, and others yet to be discovered and named; have different degrees and types of involvement in the 1958 covert LSD drug experimentation program. Their relationship to each other and to the plaintiff is not yet developed by the record since this case is still at the pleading stage without an answer having yet been filed or any substantial discovery undertaken. (The eleventh circuit appeal was an interlocutory appeal.) Whether some or all of the defendants are "superior officers" in a disciplinary or military context within the contemplation of this Court's opinion in *Chappell* cannot yet be determined as it can on plenary appeal. There is also no record yet to develop how the LSD testing supposedly related to military service, which is pertinent to the *Feres* and *Chappell* analysis.

For this reason, this Court would be in a far better position to review these issues on a plenary appeal from

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4. *Feres v. United States,* 340 U.S. 135 (1950).

a final judgment after a full record has been developed, as discussed *infra*. In this same vein, both Petitioners also repeatedly state that all the individual defendants were acting under the control of the army and pursuant to military orders. The state defendants assert in their Petition that they had nothing to do with the development of this program, or the contract under which they acted, but they were merely ministerial characters controlled by the army, with no individual authority.

Suffice it to say, once again, that these assertions are completely outside the record. Certainly the federal defendants have never admitted that they completely controlled the state defendants and, because of the potential conflicts, the separate groups of defendants are being separately represented and are filing separate Petitions for Certiorari.

The state defendants assert (at page 17 of their Petition) that they "were admittedly minor figures in a federal military program." To our knowledge, nobody except the state defendants has admitted any such thing. There is no evidence yet whether they were civilian employees, independent contractors, or even joint venturers. There are not even any sworn allegations to this effect. The state defendants admit (at page 15 of their Petition) that we have had virtually no pre-trial discovery of their involvement, however they argue that we should not be able to discover anything about their contractual involvement because that would involve "inquiry into, and second guessing of military orders."

It is against this background that we respectfully urge this Court to conclude that the issues in this case are not "certworthy."

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

I. General Certworthiness

The Petitioners assert generally that the issues in this case are of great practical importance to the armed forces and to civilian employees. That is only true if there are many other similarly situated plaintiffs who were fraudulently induced to become human subjects for LSD experiments. The government has never admitted that.

In truth, this case involves a very narrow holding based on a unique factual situation. The district judge (a nine year veteran on the fedral court and a state trial judge for fourteen years before that) stated: "This Court has seen few cases which more desparately cry out for and demand judicial redress." (51a). This case presents shades of an Orwellian novel where even one's own creative thought process is altered and controlled by the government. The district judge noted: "The acts alleged to have been committed by the officers and agents named as defendants in this case are insidious to the most fundamental rights protected by our Constitution: the right of an individual to control his mind, his private thoughts, and his bodily integrity." (51a). "The conduct alleged in this case would shock—if not outrage—the conscience of any court, and is most certainly protected against by the Constitution of the United States." (65a). Obviously, this is not a garden variety *Feres* or *Chappell* type case, and it is not likely to be a recurring fact pattern. We know of no other case that will turn on this one.

Perhaps even more importantly, the interlocutory nature of this case makes certiorari review by this Court

inappropriate. This Court has indicated on a number of occasions that it will not grant certiorari to review a nonfinal order except in extraordinary circumstances. Eg. *American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. R. Co.*, 148 U.S. 372, 384 (1893); *Cobbledick v. United States*, 309 U.S. 323, 324-325 (1940); *Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.*, 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1915); *Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R.*, 389 U.S. 327 (1967). Although the eleventh circuit below ultimately accepted review of the interlocutory order certified for appeal, one panel on the eleventh circuit initially declined to accept interlocutory review even at that level. (See Appendix "B" to this brief.) That says something about the certworthiness of this case at the Supreme Court level.

The federal defendants have also petitioned this Court to review the eleventh circuit's decision in *Johnson v. United States*, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985), reinstated en banc, 779 F.2d 1492 (1986), which was cited by the eleventh circuit in the present case, and they argue that this Court should certainly accept certiorari in this case if it does so in *Johnson*. We disagree because, although we concur with the eleventh circuit's decision in *Johnson*, there are material differences between the two cases. In fact, the district judge who dismissed the *Johnson* case was the same judge who refused to dismiss this case.

First, *Johnson* has nothing to do with a *Bivens* action against individual federal officers.

Second, counsel representing *Johnson* before this Court have admitted there is a direct conflict on identical facts between circuit courts on the issue decided in *Johnson*. That is not the case here, however, since this case is factually distinguishable and this case raises serious ques-

tions about Plaintiff's active duty status, unlike *Johnson*. The injury in this case did not occur during the course of a military rescue operation as in *Johnson*, but rather, under circumstances far more attenuated from military service.

Third, the *Johnson* case went up to the eleventh circuit on a plenary appeal from a final order dismissing the case with prejudice, rather than on review of an interlocutory order as in this case.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, the *Johnson* case will govern all incidents of military air accidents in which FAA or other non-military personnel may arguably be negligent. Obviously that is a fact pattern capable of recurring time and again, which makes that case far more "certworthy" than this one. We do not believe (certainly we hope) the facts of *this* case would ever again occur in this country.

Fifth, the plaintiff in *Johnson* received a full range of Veterans' Benefits before bringing an FTCA action, however in this case such administrative benefits are not available. This case is entirely independent of *Johnson;* it is far narrower in application and less certworthy.

II. FTCA Claim

The government's main argument is that the eleventh circuit exceeded its jurisdiction by resurrecting the FTCA claim after the district court had entered an order pursuant to Rule 54 (b) for a partial final judgment, which (the government says) should have been appealed when it was entered. However, as stated above, no final judgment was entered by the clerk on the civil docket pursuant to the court's Rule 54 (b) order directing the clerk to enter

it, nor was any notice of entry of judgment mailed by the clerk to the parties pursuant to Rule 77 (d).

Under F.R.C.P. 54 (b), the district court may "direct the entry of a final judgment" as to fewer than all of the parties by making "an express direction for the entry of judgment" to the clerk. Here, the district court "ordered that the clerk enter final judgment in favor of the United States." (54a-55a). However, that "order" is not self executing and is not appealable. (From its own language, the order was obviously not intended to be self executing.)

F.R.A.P. 4 (a)(6) provides that a judgment is "entered," for appeal purposes, when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58 and 79 (a) of the F.R.C.P. Rules 58 and 79 (a) require the clerk to "enter" the judgment, as a separate document, on the civil docket, and provide that it shall only be effective when that has been accomplished. See also Form 32, appended to the F.R.C.P. The federal courts have repeatedly noted that until the clerk enters a separate judgment on the civil docket pursuant to Rules 58 and 79 (a), the appeal time does not begin to run. *United States v. Indrelunas,* 411 U.S. 216 (1973); *Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis,* 435 U.S. 381 (1978); *Ferrell v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co.,* 585 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1978); *Rappaport v. United States,* 557 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1977).

Even if the clerk had followed through and entered a final judgment on the civil docket, it still would not foreclose a later inquiry into the partial final judgment for several reasons. First, the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter a partial final judgment for the United States on grounds of sovereign immunity; at most, all it could do was dismiss the action without prejudice for the reasons explained in *Stanley v. Central Intel-*

ligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time in the litigation and cannot be waived by any party's action or inaction. F.R.C.P. 12 (h); *Kain v. Winslow Mfg., Inc.,* 736 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984); *Eagerton v. Valuations, Inc.,* 698 F.2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1983).

Second, we would have been hard pressed in 1982 to appeal the partial final judgment back to the fifth circuit since it was based on the fifth circuit's opinion in this case in 1981 in *Stanley v. C.I.A., supra.* It probably could have been changed to become a dismissal of the United States instead of a final judgment, but nothing substantive could possibly have been accomplished since the appellate court had just ruled on the Plaintiff's FTCA claim. The government would probably have characterized such an appeal as frivolous.

Third, even if there had been a final judgment entered which was not appealed, Plaintiff would now certainly have a viable motion for relief from that judgment under Rule 60 (b), for reasons number (4), (5) and (6) listed under that rule. The eleventh circuit's opinion in this case could be construed to simply support a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment when the case returns to the district court on remand.

Apart from the procedural issue concerning the Rule 54 (b) order, the federal petitioners do not seem to challenge the eleventh circuit's discussion of how an appellate court that has once created the "law of the case" can reopen the issue in a later appeal when controlling authority has changed in the interim or manifest injustice would otherwise result. See also *Westbrook v. Zant,* 743 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1984); *Yamamoto v. Omiya,* 564 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977); *Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Co.,* 500 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1974).

The federal petitioners are incorrect in stating (at page 11) that there is no dispute Plaintiff's injuries were incurred incident to military service. Although the fifth circuit so held in the first appeal in this case (67a-95a), we disagreed then and we still dispute it. The fifth circuit focused on the Plaintiff's having "volunteered" for the program and cited a string of "volunteer" cases (72a-73a); but overlooked the fact that Plaintiff was not a true volunteer because his consent had been fraudulently extracted.

The fifth circuit also expressed reliance on the fact that the drug experiments occurred on a military base. (75a). Since that time, this Court has discounted the importance of that one fact. In *United States v. Shearer,* 473 U.S. ....., 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) this Court noted that *Feres* seems best explained by the military discipline rationale, and that other rationales sometimes advanced in the past to support the *Feres* doctrine are "no longer controlling." *Shearer,* 105 S.Ct. 3043, n. 4. This Court stated, "the situs of the [incident] is not nearly as important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions." *Id.* at 105 S.Ct. 3043.

An activity should be deemed "incident to military service" only when the policy factors that support the doctrine are applicable to the facts. When the reason for the doctrine does not apply, the doctrine itself should not be applied. As this Court stated in *Shearer,* "[t]he *Feres* doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined. . ."

The Plaintiff here was not on his regular active duty status while at Edgewood Arsenal during the testing program. The eleventh circuit noted this in its opinion below. (12a). Plaintiff was released from his duty status

at Fort Knox, and while at Edgewood Arsenal, he had complete control over his movements (when he was not drugged). At any time, he could withdraw from the program and return to Fort Knox. There is no evidence as to any disciplinary relationship between Plaintiff and anyone else at the testing laboratories. There is no evidence as to his technical duty status during that month. There is also no record of how the LSD testing supposedly related to Plaintiff's military service.[5]

This case is unlike the cases relied on by the Petitioners. There is no questioning of direct military orders involved here (unlike the atomic testing cases), no threatened effect on performance of military duty or discipline, no facts involving the special nature of military life, the Plaintiff was not availing himself of one of the benefits of military service when the incident occurred (unlike the cases involving medical negligence by military doctors during the course of rendering free medical care to servicemen), nor is this case similar to the typical "volunteer" cases since Plaintiff never gave an informed consent to any drug experimentation.

Nor does this case require a civilian court to second-guess the wisdom of military decisions. The allegations here raise a case of patent illegality and violation of the Nuremberg Code, not just a question of the wisdom of military decision-making. Human experimentation of this nature has been condemned and declared illegal by every pertinent statute and regulation of the United States and by international standards. See *United States v. Karl Brant, et al.*, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before Nuremberg

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5. The mission of the army is to preserve peace and security, provide for the defense, support and implement national policies and objectives, and to overcome other aggressive nations. 10 U.S.C. §3062.

Military Tribunals, 181, 182 (1949). The Nuremberg Code has been adopted by the AMA and by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army, Navy and Air Force.[6]

A mechanical application of the *Feres* doctrine, in a case falling outside the rationale of *Feres,* would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act. If the *Feres* doctrine is to be applied regardless of whether the rationale applies, then American servicemen are reduced to a worse position than federal prisoners who may sue the government under the FTCA for negligence of prison officials. *United States v. Muniz,* 374 U.S. 150 (1963).

Additionally, even if the Plaintiff's activity at the testing laboratories is deemed incident to his miltary service, the reasoning of the eleventh circuit in *Johnson v. United States,* 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985), approved en banc 779 F.2d 1492 (1986), is sound and should be approved, if this Court reaches the merits in *Johnson.* It presents a balanced approach between the rationale behind the *Feres* doctrine and the public policy underlying the Federal Tort Claims Act. If the tortfeasor is not a member of the armed forces nor a civilian employee engaged in activities usually associated with the armed forces, *then* the Court should consider the rationale supporting the *Feres* doctrine to determine to what extent, if any, the allowance of the claim would circumvent the purpose of the doctrine. (LSD experimentation is not an activity usually associated with the armed forces.) If the prosecution of the claim would not compromise the military disciplinary structure nor otherwise encroach upon the

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6. There are supporting documents in the original record in this case described at R. 73-74, 140, 141-146, which were placed in a separate brown envelope—See R. 140.

rationale of the *Feres* doctrine, then there is no sound reason for barring the action.

III. Bivens Claim

Even if the *Feres* doctrine does apply here to preclude the FTCA claim against the United States, the eleventh circuit was correct in finding that it would not necessarily preclude the *Bivens* action against the responsible individual federal defendants. The eleventh circuit carefully distinguished this case from *Chappell v. Wallace,* 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (1983), by noting how the "special factors" present in *Chappell* are not present in this case.

In *Chappell, supra,* the defendants were all clearly "superior officers" (unlike the present case) consisting of the commanding officer and other officers on a navy combat vessel, who were being sued by enlisted navy men aboard the vessel. The Plaintiffs in *Chappell* claimed that because of their minority race the officers on board failed to assign them to desirable duties and gave them low performance evaluations, thus impeding their advancement in the navy. There is a world of difference between those allegations, which clearly involve command decisions affecting the Plaintiffs, and the allegations in the present case. This Court's holding in *Chappell* was premised on the need for knee-jerk reflex obedience to orders from superior military officers, and the disruption *in that type of case* that might result "if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court."

The Petitioners rely on this Court's seemingly broad statement in *Chappell;* "We hold that enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional viola-

tions." (103 S.Ct. at 2368). However, in context, this Court did not say it was creating a "per se" prohibition on all *Bivens* actions whenever the *Feres* doctrine would preclude an FTCA suit against the government. In fact, this Court noted it was dealing with a nonstatutory, constitutional remedy rather than Congress' intent behind the FTCA, and this Court stated; ". . . The Court's analysis in *Feres* 'guides' [not 'controls'] our analysis in this case." *Id.* at 2365. This Court specifically cautioned that its decision should not be read to mean that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service. *Id.* at 2367.[7]

The federal petitioners argue that this Court should accept certiorari because the eleventh circuit's decision directly conflicts with the decisions of three other circuits in *Mollnow v. Carlton,* 716 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1983); *Gaspard v. United States,* 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983); and *Jaffee v. United States,* 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981). That is not the case. In fact, those cases were expressly distinguished by the district judge in this case. (32a-33a).

Although in *Mollnow,* the ninth circuit seems to interpret *Chappell* as imposing a per se prohibition against *Bivens* actions, one month later the same court (through a different panel) seemed to take a different view of *Chappell.* See *Gonzalez v. Dept. of the Army,* 718 F.2d 926, at

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7. Petitioners argue that the cases cited by this Court for this proposition in *Chappell* were not civil damage lawsuits, but habeas corpus or injunction cases, and therefore civil lawsuits for damages are still prohibited per se. Petitioners fail to explain how habeas corpus or injunction cases are any less disruptive or intrusive, or why they may not also involve second guessing military decision making. This is not a logical distinction. The nature of the relief sought is not nearly as important as the potential impact of the case on the military disciplinary structure, and that depends on the facts of the case.

929 (9th Cir. 1983). *Gaspard, supra,* and *Jaffee, supra,* are easily distinguishable. The Plaintiff here was not acting pursuant to direct orders, unlike the nuclear testing cases such as *Gaspard* and *Jaffee.* As the eleventh circuit below noted:

> Because he was surreptitiously administered the drug, Stanley could not possibly have challenged his 'orders' to drink the clear substance. 'The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders' are not implicated by the facts of this case. (12a).

The "direct conflict" asserted by the Petitioners, for which they ask this Court to accept certiorari, does not really exist.[8]

Contrary to the statement by the federal petitioners (at p. 16, n. 11), the federal courts are not unanimous in reading *Chappell* to be a per se prohibition of *Bivens* actions by military servicemen under all circumstances. In addition to the eleventh circuit in this case, the eighth circuit recently took the same flexible approach and expressly rejected the "per se prohibition" interpretation of *Chappell.*

In *Brown v. United States,* 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984) the court applied this Court's language in *Chappell* and went on to analyze whether the rationale of the *Feres* doctrine would be fulfilled by applying it to the facts before the court. The court concluded that the case presented such a "unique factual situation" that the Plaintiff should be able to bring a *Bivens* action even though an

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8. The Court in *Gaspard* expressly stated that "it is crystal clear that *Bivens* claims are distinct from FTCA actions, and the *Feres* bar therefore does not automatically preclude the *Bivens* claim." 713 F.2d at 1102. See also *Gaspard, supra* at 1105, n. 17.

FTCA claim could not be prosecuted under the *Feres* doctrine. This Court denied certiorari in *Brown* (see 105 S.Ct. 3524) and should, for the same reasons, deny certiorari in this case which presents the same issue as *Brown.*

The present case involves facts even more unique than in *Brown, supra.* This case does not involve or threaten to compromise military discipline, nor the "special nature of military life." A case like this could easily involve a civilian, as much as a military serviceman.

A trial in this case would not involve second guessing of any military orders directed to this Plaintiff, since he was under no orders. The petitioners argue it could ultimately involve an inquiry into higher echelon military decision-making. However, if that was the standard for prohibiting a *Bivens* action in any case, no matter what kind of wrongful act may be perpetrated on a serviceman, the defendants could always remain immune by asserting their act was a result of "military decision-making."

The acceptance of the "per se immunity" rule argued for by petitioners under the type of facts in this case would be tantamount to admitting that because of Plaintiff's military status, federal officers can willfully and knowingly violate his constitutional rights without fear of accountability in the civil justice system. Would such a rule promote discipline in the military or encourage corruption? What would be the effect on morale and discipline if the judiciary countenanced (by ignoring) such patent illegality? To deny Plaintiff civil redress under these circumstances would do more to undermine military discipline than to permit recovery.

This Court has held that even a convicted and incarcerated federal prisoner may bring a *Bivens* action against

prison officials for violation of constitutional rights, under compelling circumstances. *Carlson v. Green,* 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Likewise for an FTCA action alleging negligence of prison officials. *United States v. Muniz, supra.* If the disciplinary structure within our prisons is not so overwhelming under all circumstances to preclude a civil lawsuit, should it be so in the military? By arguing for a "per se" prohibition against allowing a *Bivens* action in this case, the government is actually saying that an army master sergeant like Mr. Stanley should be relegated to a position inferior to that of a convicted and incarcerated federal prisoner. What kind of rational policy can justify such an anomalous result?

The federal petitioners also discuss, in general terms, the possibility of veterans benefits that may be available to Plaintiff. The petitioners have failed to specify at any time in this litigation what particular veterans benefits cover this type of claim and compensate for the type of injury that has been suffered here. The petitioners argue that there does not have to be "adequate" administrative compensation available, so long as Congress has shown some "activity in the field," which by itself creates a "special factor" that militates against allowing a *Bivens* action.[9] That is not an accurate statement of the current law.

Unless this Court intended in *Chappell, supra,* to silently modify the rule in *Carlson v. Green,* 446 U.S. 14 (1980), there must be a showing that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it *explicitly* declared to be a substitute for recovery under the Constitution,

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9. The federal petitioners appear to concede at footnote 12, page 18 of their Petition for Certiorari, that the Veterans Benefits Act does not provide this Plaintiff with an adequate alternative remedy.

before this will automatically preclude a *Bivens* action. *Carlson, supra* at 446 U.S. 19-20. The alternative remedial scheme must be equally as effective as the damages action. *Id.* at 446 U.S. 18-19.[10] Mere "activity in the field" by Congress is just one factor that goes into the equation, but it is not by itself overriding. It was not "ignored" by the eleventh circuit below, as petitioners argue (at p. 18, n. 12). The eleventh circuit expressly considered it but concluded "that this factor also does not militate against permitting Stanley's Bivens claim." (12a).

The eleventh circuit, of course, did *not* hold that *Chappell* is limited only to cases involving the Code of Military Justice as an alternative compensation scheme. The argument of the federal petitioners to that effect (at page 18) is disingenuous. The eleventh circuit simply noted that the "intramilitary administrative procedures which the Court found adequate to redress the servicemen's racial discrimination complaints in *Chappell* [the Board for the Correction of Naval Records and the Uniform Code of Military Justice] are clearly inadequate to compensate Stanley for the violations complained of here." (12a-13a).

The eleventh circuit was correct on this point. The administrative remedies which would have fully compensated the plaintiffs in *Chappell* for the type of wrong inflicted in that case (retroactive back pay and promotions, and correction of naval records) would be meaningless to Mr. Stanley in the present case. Such remedies cannot correct the constitutional wrong done to Mr.

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10. Veterans benefits are not equally effective as recovery under the Constitution since it neither makes the Plaintiff whole nor does it deter future abuses of power as does a *Bivens* action.

Stanley since, unlike *Chappell,* he is not just claiming the army cheated him out of money, or a promotion, or put unfair performance evaluations in his records. His claim is a tort claim and a constitutional claim, which has already been denied at the administrative level by the Army Claims Service. (70a, n. 5). Whatever Congress' "activity in the field" is supposed to be here, it has not helped Mr. Stanley very much.

IV. The State Petitioners

The main argument raised by the state petitioners in Case No. 86-443, concerning the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1985, is actually a non-issue before this Court since neither of the lower courts addressed it. The eleventh circuit below expressly declined to address the civil rights claims because; "not only have those claims not been addressed by the district court, but they are also beyond the scope of the issue for which we certified this interlocutory appeal." (22a). There are motions to dismiss the civil rights claims that are still pending in the district court. (State Petition at p. 9, n. 2). The state petitioners admit (at p. 9) that the civil rights claims against them have not yet been addressed by the lower courts. Accordingly, that issue is not presented for review to this Court at this time.

In *Chappell,* although this Court addressed the *Bivens* action it expressly declined to address the civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1985 because it had not been addressed by the circuit court of appeals. *Chappell, supra* at 103 S.Ct. 2368, n. 3.

To the extent the state petitioners assert they were "civilian employees, agents of the military" (p. 11), we mentioned before there is no evidence of that. There is

no evidence yet whether they were civilian employees, independent contractors, or joint venturers.

The individual defendants (state and federal) are entitled, of course, to raise a *qualified* immunity defense if they acted in good faith (although that has not yet been pleaded). *Butz v. Economou,* 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Their arguments regarding the minor extent of their participation and their good faith are both outside the record and only relevant anyway to a qualified immunity defense.

The state petitioners argue that failing to grant them complete immunity in this case will inevitably result in state universities withholding their assistance and expertise from the military. That is no more true than the assertion that failing to grant governmental contractors who build military products a complete immunity from suit by injured servicemen will result in drying up the source of all such contracts. Some courts (including the eleventh circuit) have recognized a *limited* government contractor immunity in the case of defective military products;[11] but here the state defendants ask for *complete* immunity before the facts revealing the nature and extent of their involvement have even been discovered.

If the issue was properly before this Court we would agree that the policy factors applying to the allowance or prohibition of a *Bivens* action against federal officers are logically applicable to a civil rights action against state officers. We would also rely on the previous discussion concerning a *Bivens* action and FTCA action under the unique facts in this case.

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11. *Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.*, 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

If certiorari review is accepted, the Petitioners have substantially argued the merits already, as we have had to do in response, and further briefing would be repetitive. We believe this Court could invoke Supreme Court Rule 23 (1), and consider the merits on the basis of these briefs.

Respectfully submitted,

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November, 1986

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

DOCKET ENTRIES

CIV JAG 8141

STANLEY, JAMES B.
Plaintiff,

vs.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; U. S. ARMY; (JOSEPH R. BERTINO, M.D. BOARD OF REGENTS UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND; H.D. COLLIER; ALBERT DREISBACH; BERNARD G. ELFERT, M.D.; RICHARD HELMS; GERALD KLEE, M.D.; VAN SIM, M.D.; WALTER WEINTRAUB; M.D. & UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL FEDERAL & STATE AGENTS & OFFICERS.)
Add'l defts. per 2nd amended complaint,
Defendants.

PERSONAL INJURY: 28 U.S.C.A. 1346(b), 2671 et seq.

SUIT FOR DAMAGES:

CAUSE

Alleges defts' were negligent in administering the drug (LSD) in the experimentation, tests.

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DATE	NR.	PROCEEDINGS
1982		
Sept 8	131	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by defts. (Pleading from Appeal U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota # 82-1041).
21	132	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by defts.
Oct 6	133	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by defts.

8	134	LETTER from Richard A. Kupfer, Esq., to Judge Gonzalez, Jr. RE: Pending Pleadings & Assistance to court in Resolving Pending Issues.
8	135	LETTER from Richard A. Kupfer, Esq., to Judge Gonzalez, Jr., RE: Oral Argument on 11/12/81 & Whether Bivens cause of Action can be said to accrue.
8	136	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority by Pltf.
15	137	ORDER (JAG) Upon Defts' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment it is ORDERED that claims against Gov't brought under Federal Tort Claims Act, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. As to Claims against the Gov't brought pursuant to Bivens, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. As to Claims against the Unknown Individual Federal Agents & Officers, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. (EOD 11/3/82) (see original pleading for details).
29	138	MOTION for Partial Final Judgment by defts., Central Intelligence agency, U.S. Dept of Defense, U.S. Army & U.S. of America. NR
29	139	MEMORANDUM of Law in Support of above Motion.
29	140	SUGGESTION of Interest of the U.S.
Nov 3	141	MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to Defts' Motion for Partial Final Judgment by Pltf. NR

10	142	ORDER (JAG-11/09/82) Motion for Partial Final Judgment by Deft., USA is Granted; The clerk to enter final judgment in favor of USA; Claims against individual defts. vacated and withdrawn. (EOD-11/15/82). (m-11/24/82).
17	143	MOTION to Proceed with discovery & Have court enter order cancelling Stay of Discovery by Pltf. NR 152
18	144	MOTION for rehearing by pltf. NR 151
18	145	RESPONSE to Motion for Partial Final Judgment & Suggestion of Interest by Pltf.
18	146	CERTIFICATE of service of Motion for rehearing & Response to Motion for partial final judgment by pltf.
18	147	ORDER (JAG-11/17/82) DENIED as Moot Pltf's Motion for extension of time to respond to deft's Motion for partial final judgment. (EOD 11/23/82)
22	148	OPPOSITION to Pltf's Motion to proceed with discovery & have court enter Order cancelling stay of discovery by defts.
23	149	FOURTH Notice of Supplemental Authority by Pltf.
30	150	REPLY to motion for rehearing and response by defts.
Dec 10	151	ORDER (JAG-12/8/82) denying pltf's Motion for rehearing of court's Order 11/9/82. (EOD 12/14/82)
16	152	ORDER (JAG-12/15/82) granting pltf's motion to proceed with discovery & vacating court's previous order staying discovery. (EOD 12/21/82)

APPENDIX B

(Filed May 14, 1984)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 84-2018
84-2019

JAMES B. STANLEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

versus

UNITED STATES and JOSEPH
R. BERTINO, Et Al.,
Defendants-Petitioners.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

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Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RONEY and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

IT IS ORDERED that motion Federal defendants for permission to appeal pursuant to USC 28 1292(b) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motion of Maryland defendants for permission to appeal pursuant to USC 28 1292(b) is denied.